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ABSTRACT: 
On the Blank: Photography, Writing, Drawing.
My visual practice is concerned with an articulation of the ‘left-out-thing’, remnant or blank, 
produced by and embedded within technologies of representation; which themselves echo 
the mechanisms through which an identity is formed. As automatic, ‘empty apparatus’, 
technological devices threaten as well as construct this self image. 
This thesis proposes a new theoretical interpretation for art practices that engage with 
this empty space, or ‘shifter’; understood as a form of punctuation around which meaning 
revolves. Indexing an object both absent and ‘has been’, the kind of mark-making that falls 
LQWRWKLVFDWHJRU\FDQEHLGHQWL¿HG±OLNHDQK\VWHULFDOV\PSWRP±DVWKHUHSURGXFWLRQRIDQ
unrepresentable sign.
It is through my practical work, which explores the link between the photograph, the body, 
DQGWKHZULWWHQVHQWHQFHWKDWP\FRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH¿HOGRI¿QHDUWSUDFWLFHLVSULPDULO\
offered. The way in which an image is put together, or a sentence is organised, can be 
FRQVLGHUHGDVDQH[HPSODU\GH¿QLWLRQRIVXEMHFWLYLW\LQRSHUDWLRQ<HWDV$QQ%DQ¿HOG
(1987) has argued, after the invention of the lens, novelistic writing began to index a ‘world 
without a self’. My visual work, which frequently looks like writing, attempts to construct a 
similar ‘grammatical’ form: one in which the “I” is absent. 
The aim of my work is to stage or record this empty place, understood as a disturbance, 
impediment or failure within speech; as the text’s undertow; and equated with a photographic 
±RURSWLFDOµXQFRQVFLRXV¶7KLVIDLOXUHWKLVIDXOWLQODQJXDJHGHWHFWHGLQWKHODSVHVJDSV
DQGVLOHQFHVZLWKLQDERG\RIZULWLQJRULQDQLPDJH±DJDSXSRQZKLFKVXFKODQJXDJH
systems are nevertheless hinged - is, I suggest, both the place where technology and the 
non-self are linked and, paradoxically, the site where the “I” is constituted.
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PART ONE
5

‘… I was reminded of something, an elusive rhythm, 
a fragment of lost words, that I had heard somewhere 
a long time ago. For a moment a phrase tried to 
take shape in my mouth and my lips parted like a 
dumb man’s, as though there was more struggling 
upon them than a wisp of startled air. But they made 
no sound, and what I had almost remembered was 
uncommunicable forever.’ i
‘Nothing tells memories from ordinary moments; only 
afterwards do they claim remembrance.’ ii
6
i  Fitzgerald, F.S, (1990) The Great Gatsby, Penguin, London, p106
LL )URPWKH(QJOLVKWUDQVODWLRQRIWKH¿OPLa Jetée, (1962) directed by Chris Marker, Video from Argos Films
7
 8 
The Spider Web Incident  
When I was between nine and ten years old, glancing at my father's newspaper, I stumbled 
across an image that shocked me. Since then, every time I am reminded of this incident, I 
experience a sort of panic. It is as if a piece of my self ‘cuts out’ - my mind goes completely 
blank. This evocation has echoed through the years; as a kind of recurrent forgetfulness, it is 
both event and figure on which my practice is based.  
 
As an artist, I am interested in the link between a sudden remembered event and a coincident 
moment of self-obliteration or blanking, and the (im)possibility of making a mark in relation to, 
or at the same time as, this moment. My visual work aims at representing something 
connected to the appearance or disappearance of the self, or with what Proust refers to as 
the “intermittence”
 1
 of the self; where selfhood is understood as something that has already 
been written; that writes, as repetition, automatically, but which is intercut or interrupted by 
something else, connected to the body, that cannot be written, that appears to exceed or fall 
short of representation; something that flickers on and off, that is sometimes there and 
sometimes not. The images I make, in which something fluctuating appears to be being 
recorded, mapped out or traced, have a kind of diagrammatic character, but they also lean 
towards that which is meaningless, unintelligible or illegible: a scribble, or a coded sign or 
message, but one in which gaps, lapses and silences play a component part. 
 
What I saw in the newspaper, all those years ago, were two photographs accompanying an 
article on the effects of ‘drug-taking’ on a spider. Two different photographs side by side, two 
different ‘instances’ of the creature: one before and one after it had eaten a fly laced with 
LSD. The spider itself was in neither image, represented instead – or, defined, perhaps – by 
her web: one perfect and the other (after the ‘drug-taking’) a chaotic shambles. However, 
apart from the purpose of the photographs (that of terrifying any potential drug user into ‘just 
saying no’), the question for me still remains: what terrified me about the image itself?  
 
                   
                                                
1
 “Les Intermittences du Coeur” was the original title for Proust’s novel A la Recherche du Temps Perdu, 
in which he makes clear that the laws that define our sense of ‘self’, bound up with the ‘intermittences of 
the heart’, are linked to ‘disturbances of memory’, and connected to the body as well as to the emotions. 
Proust, M. (2002), In Search of Lost Time, Volume IV: Sodom and Gomorrah, Penguin, London, p159 
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What to call it? Fascination? No… what it produces in me is the very opposite of hebetude; something 
more like an internal agitation… the pressure of the unspeakable which wants to be spoken
2
 
 
Clearly, I have been marked by this image.
3
 And by that I mean something rather more 
complicated than the thought that I just ‘can’t forget it’. In fact, it seems to me as if there are 
two kinds of ‘memory’ at stake here. The first is of an everyday sort, narrative-based. Used in 
every attempt I make to describe an event, it is the memory I draw on in order to endlessly ‘go 
on’ about it. The second, which in fact precedes the first, is linked to the actual instance, the 
moment of remembering - and leaves me lost for words. Is the ‘blanking’ that occurs a 
remembering somehow co-joined to forgetting? Am I dealing with a memory that is simply out 
of reach – the problem being merely that I have a bad memory?  Or is the experience 
connected to something radically different from anything that could have been memorised - 
committed to memory - in the first place? Is what occurs beyond memory? In other words, 
might there be an action, connected to ways in which I experience something past, that is not 
the same as a memory of it - an experience that, while resounding in the body, nevertheless 
remains cognitively inaccessible to me, and is thus unrepresentable? 
 
In his book Camera Lucida (1980), Roland Barthes remarks that since the invention of 
photography one can 'see oneself (differently from in a mirror)', adding that he thinks it ‘odd 
no one has thought of the disturbance (to civilisation) that this new action causes'
4
. 
Photography ‘reproduces to infinity’, as Barthes notes, ‘what Lacan calls the Tuché, the 
Occasion, the Encounter, the Real’.
5
 As many commentators have pointed out, the 
photograph is an image that is also an imprint; an image that has been ‘stamped out’ through 
direct contact with reality – a reality which has, so to speak, been impressed upon it. It 
therefore, as Rosalind Krauss notes, belongs to that category of sign (established by C.S. 
Peirce)
6
 as indexical. Photography’s physical genesis ‘seems to short circuit or disallow those 
processes of schematisation or symbolic intervention’
7
 at work within other kinds of 
representations, such as paintings or drawings. In other words, photography disturbs 
civilisation because it evades or bypasses the artificial, culturally produced, representational 
systems that, for Lacan, are classified under the register of the Symbolic. Instead, as Barthes 
suggests, a photograph is pinned to the Real.
8
  
                                                
2
 Barthes, R. (2000), Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, Vintage, London, p19 
3
 I am deliberately echoing the opening sequence of Chris Markers film La Jetée. The film begins with 
the words ‘This is a story of a man marked by an image from childhood.’ The idea that one can be 
‘marked’ by an image is explored more fully by Victor Burgin in his essay ‘Marker Marked’. See Burgin, 
V. (2004), The Remembered Film, Reaktion Books, London. 
4
 Barthes, R. (2000), Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, Vintage, London, p12 
5
 Ibid., p4 
6
 Peirce, C.S. (1955), ‘Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs,’ in Philosophic Writings of Peirce, Dover 
Publications, New York. 
7
 Krauss, R. (1986), ‘Notes on the Index’ in The Originality of the Avant Garde and other Modernist 
Myths, MIT Press, USA, p203 
8
 The Real and the Symbolic registers, combined with that of the Imaginary, form Lacan’s tri-partite 
system through which the subject experiences the world. The Symbolic order is that of language, 
communication and exchange and consists of an endless series of substitutable signifiers that slide 
along an associative chain. The Real is unsymbolisable, unrepresentable, unspeakable; it is everything 
 10 
 
What is the relationship between something I keep remembering – yet cannot bring to mind - 
and these photographic records? Obviously, memory plays a part in all this, but not the kind 
of memory that Barthes describes as ‘anamnesic’
9
, out of which culture, history, and a sense 
of identity - ‘selfhood’ - is woven. Instead, as Barthes insists, what is encountered in the 
photograph is ‘ecmnesic’
10
 - outside of memory. ‘Not only’, he states, ‘is photography never, 
in essence a memory […] but it actually blocks memory, quickly becomes a counter 
memory’.
11
 Photography draws a blank. Yet it is also ‘as certain as remembrance’
12
, in the 
face of which ‘words fail’.
13 
If in describing the photographic affect as ‘ecmnesic’ Barthes is 
associating it with a kind of memory loss, it is one that can, however, be linked to its opposite: 
involuntary recollection.
14
 Because, in fact, the ecmnesiac doesn't forget everything. 
Retaining a memory for events in the remote past, s/he suffers instead from a lack of a 
present. The past, as lack in the present, 'intrudes’
15
. Ecmnesia, then, can perhaps be 
thought of as a kind of selective forgetting; momentary blanks cause a breakdown of the 
unified ‘self’ that memory weaves together. As the novelist Debra Dean suggests, the 
experience could be thought of as ‘like disappearing for a few moments at a time.’
16
 
Considered from this perspective, Barthes’ photographic remembrance – which he opposes 
to culturally regulated memory or ‘history’ – is quite literally ‘lost time’.  
 
What links the operation of the photograph to that of ‘remembrance’, therefore, hinges on 
what photography points out about the constitution of the self - that it contains an element of 
something erratic or variable, something not entirely present. Put another way; the 
photographic process reproduces a situation where presence might be equated with absence. 
This is because, through the operation of the index, which, as remarked upon above, 
                                                                                                                                       
outside the other two registers. The Imaginary register is connected to the self-image (i.e. to fantasy, to 
the imagination). In Lacanian theory, more on which below, identity resides in an image, established at 
the ‘Mirror Stage’, which is mediated by the (m)other through the Symbolic. So with regard to Barthes’ 
assertion that photography has brought about a new way of seeing oneself - “differently than in a 
mirror”: if, as Barthes implies, the photograph bypasses the Symbolic, then that which is ‘civilised’ within 
the image of the self is ‘disturbed’ by that which is reproduced by the photographic process. 
9
 Barthes, R. (2000), Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, Vintage, London, p65 
10
 Ibid., p117  
11
 Ibid., p90-91 
12
Ibid., p70 
13
 Ibid., p109 
14
 This ‘remembrance’ is memory that is always ‘involuntary’. [Ibid., p70] In suggesting this Barthes is 
directly quoting Proust [See Proust, M. (2002), In Search of Lost Time, Volume IV: Sodom and 
Gomorrah, Penguin, London, p158].   
15
 This idea comes from Elena Seymenliyska's review of The Madonnas of Leningrad by Debra Dean. 
[Guardian newspaper (01/-7/06)] The protagonist of Dean’s novel is suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, 
which effects memory in the here and now while often leaving memories of past events intact. In this 
way I am equating Barthes’ ecmnesia with the affects of something like Alzheimer’s; where the past 
(memory) is lacking in the present, and selfhood is replaced by pure consciousness, or ‘being’. Indeed, 
as Freud argues, the two are incompatible: 'becoming conscious and leaving behind memory traces are 
processes incompatible with each other within one and the same system… conscious arises instead of 
a memory trace.' [Freud, S. (1991) On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis, ‘Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle’, Penguin, London p296 (My emphasis)]. 
16
 Dean, D. (2006), The Madonnas of Leningrad, Fourth Estate, London, p5  
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bypasses any cultural (symbolic) system of language, physical presence is registered as 
‘meaninglessness’ – or nothing.  
 
I am suggesting that there is a relationship between the operation of the photograph and that 
of remembrance. Both bring about a loss of selfhood, an absence of self. In relation to my 
reaction to the spider web images, it seems, therefore, that it was precisely because these 
images were photographs rather than illustrations or drawings (as they perhaps could have 
been) that they had the capacity to disturb in the particular way that I have outlined above; a 
disturbance that Barthes, in Camera Lucida, also registers. Yet again, although photographs, 
the images of the spider webs did have a kind of diagrammatic, illustrative, quality; the webs 
themselves were like automatic drawings, indexing a kind of collapse of ‘spider-ness’ (if you 
accept that the essence of a spider is her web). So was the disturbing quality of these images 
also connected in some way to their relation to the drawing, with this quality, combined with 
that which is intrinsic to the photograph (e.g. that it is an imprint) evoking the mark of 
something ‘not made by the hand of man, acheiropoietos?’
17
 The essence of the 
photograph
18
 is that what you see in it has undeniably been there; the image, as Barthes 
insists, is ‘extracted' by the action of light making contact with a chemically-treated surface, 
meaning that ‘the thing of the past, by its immediate radiations… has really touched the 
surface which in its turn my gaze will touch.’
19
  
 
And yet, it could be argued, it is this action, carried to a sort of (il)logical
20
 conclusion, that 
was initially set in motion or cast (like the dice)
21
 by the first mark. Michael Newman links the 
origin of drawing, which traced the object it sought to capture, to that of the first photographs, 
by suggesting that ‘writing with light [photography] began by imitating drawing’.
22
 If this is the 
case, as Newman suggests, drawing and photography might share the same ‘condition’, 
whereby the mark in or of the drawing stands for 'contact' with the thing represented  - which 
                                                
17
 Barthes, R. (2000), Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, Vintage, London, p82. See also p80, 
where Barthes suggests that Photography presents us with a new ‘experiential order of proof…a proof 
no longer induced: the proof-according-to-St.-Thomas-seeking-to-touch-the-resurrected-Christ.’ Barthes 
describes the ‘horror and fascination’ that this proof evokes, and gives as an example a photograph of a 
slave market; ‘I repeat: a photograph, not a drawing or engraving; [Barthes’ reaction] came from this: 
that there was a certainty that such a thing had existed’. My own experience of horror and fascination 
was similarly a result of this photographic ‘certainty’; although for me this certainty was combined with 
the terrifying presence of something (the spider) that, although still moving, was ‘absent’.  
18
 Certainly this photograph - taken in the late 1960’s, early 70’s - which would have been produced via 
a negative.  
19
 Ibid., p81 
20
 I call photography's 'conclusion' illogical, because by following (to the letter, perhaps) the desire to 
touch or to hold onto the Other (Butades daughter wanted to keep something of her lover for herself), 
the action of drawing with light ultimately pushes both self and other out of the picture altogether. 
21
 Barthes will equate his concept of the 'Punctum' - a purely subjective event encountered in relation to 
a photograph - with a ‘cast of the dice’. The encounter always occurs – like Proust’s Remembrance or 
Lacan’s Tuché - by accident or chance, to interrupt the normal flow of events. In the context of this 
thesis, the phrase ‘cast of the dice’ also evokes Un Coup De Dés Jamais N'abolira Le Hasard: a 
bookwork by Marcel Broodthaers, based on Stéphane Mallarme’s poem of the same title, which 
influenced me in the making of my own artbook On My nervous Illness, which is documented in the final 
section of this piece of writing. 
22
 Newman, A. (2003) (ed.), The Stage of Drawing, ‘The Marks, Traces, and Gestures of Drawing’ by 
Michael Newman, American Drawing Centre and Tate, London, p105 
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might not be the same thing as that which is being ‘depicted’. Under these conditions - of 
being imprinted with that which it represents - the mark, like the photograph, might be in a 
position to challenge the category of representation itself; to exist, as Newman suggests 
(echoing Barthes), outside of it altogether, as a ‘resemblance produced by contact, like a life 
cast or death mask, an image not made by human hands, a relic like the stain on a shroud.’
23
 
 
Newman’s essay takes as its starting point Pliny’s claim that drawing “…began with tracing an 
outline round a man’s shadow…”
24
 In the shadow, cast on a wall by a lamp, the daughter of 
Butades recognized the essence of her lover and, at the same time, all that she would lose 
when he departed. It was this realization, as an encounter with that which is already lost, that 
precipitated the first mark; a mark that functioned, Newman suggests, ‘like a memorial’.
25
 So 
the lover’s shadow, indexing the object of her desire (through her identification with it), was, 
as Butades’ daughter gazed upon it, already a 'thing of the past'. Butades’ daughter traces 
around her lover’s shadow. She doesn’t trace around her lover’s body, she captures his 
shadow: his absence. ‘If she could have’, as Newman suggests, ‘she might have taken a 
photograph’.
26
 Instead she takes the place of the camera. Performing the same action, 
Butades’ daughter produces an objective image ‘that may act as a substitute’
27
, out of that 
which is a mixture of the ephemeral, virtual, subjective and imaginary,
28
 and that which has 
an indexical relation to that which caused it. This “photographic” process, as a methodology 
for creating an image, simultaneously establishes a chain in which all subsequent marks or 
traces might be linked, related by ‘degrees of remoteness’ from the original ‘fleeting 
shadow’.
29
 Hence, as Newman suggests, the mark - that which is both substitute and 
substitutable, like words in a language – also always contains something of the shadow; that 
which is irreducible, unintended, ‘received from elsewhere’.
30
 It is in this way that Newman 
envisages the possibility that the mark or drawing, in common with the photograph, ‘names 
something inhuman’.
31
  
 
                                                
23
 Ibid., p105  
24
 Michael Newman opens his discussion on the mark with a quote from Pliny's Natural History, which 
describes the story of Butades' daughter 'who was in love with a young man; and she, when he was 
going abroad, drew in outline on the wall the shadow of his face, thrown by a lamp' See Newman, cited 
above: p93 and p106 n2). To return to Barthes' idea of 'touch', here the touch - or contact with - the 
body of the Other is also mediated by light. This is to suggest that, in an instance such as this, light itself 
becomes a sort of touch or mark that bypasses language. 
25
 Newman, M, (2003), ‘The Marks, Traces, and Gestures of Drawing’ in The Stage of Drawing, 
American Drawing Centre and Tate, London, p93 
26
 Ibid., p93 
27
 Ibid., p93 
28
 i.e. the shadow of her lover was bound up with her fantasy. 
29
Ibid., p96 Some of the themes that develop below are based on Lacan's ideas about language as 
something discontinuous, punctuated or punctured by gaps or blanks and set in motion, accidentally 
perhaps - like the first mark - by desire, by the anticipation of loss, which triggered a kind of chain 
reaction. In this way, words and sentences may also share the characteristics of marks that, as Michael 
Newman suggests, echo - or are in some way derived from - the original or 'first' mark (or signifier). This 
also implies that all marks have that which is inhuman embedded within them – as might the words in 
the chain of signifiers that a language consists of. 
30
Ibid., p93 
31
Ibid., p97 
 13 
The art historian Geoffrey Batchen also makes links between the origins of photography and 
drawing by taking, however, the reverse point of view to that suggested by Newman.
32
 
Batchen suggests that it might be possible to read, in the way this origin is articulated in one 
of the earliest photographs - Hippolyte Bayard’s Le Noyé (Self Portrait of a Drowned Man, 
1840) - ‘something of Derrida’s commentary on representation in general, assumed to be a 
complicitous entanglement of sight and blindness, absence and presence, life and death, 
construction and ruin’.
33
 For Derrida, the ruin is related to ‘the opening where one cannot 
see’:
34
 the ruin coincides with blindness. (In photography, the place from which you cannot 
see - this blindspot - is precisely that which is occupied by the camera). And yet, as Martin 
Jay points out, for Derrida all representation – and particularly drawing - coincides with and 
indeed ‘necessitates a moment of non-seeing [blindness] in which the artist depicts the ruins 
of a previous vision. Or rather, there is no initial vision that is not already a ruin.’
35
 This idea, 
Jay proposes, can be considered as ‘a visual analogy’ to Derrida’s argument that nothing 
exists 'prior to its representation’; that which you cannot see is that which was there before 
language or representation.
 
Interestingly, as Jay adds, ‘the delay and temporalization 
produced by the memory of the earlier trace [as or of nothingness] also means that there is no 
specular identity, especially when the artist paints him - or her-self.’
 36
 What about the 
photographic self-portrait? These questions evoke Barthes’ idea of a ‘disturbance’ to the 
‘mirror’ (or self) image, brought about by the invention of the photograph; in bypassing 
representation or culture, photography bypasses the self. This is to suggest that the camera 
records the self as a ‘nothing there’ – a point that Bayard was making in his photographic self 
portrait, which showed him with his eyes closed, seemingly dead, but also unseen, passed 
over - he felt his part in photography’s invention was being ignored. More importantly, which 
he in fact stated was its aim, Bayard’s image appears to show him as a decaying corpse.
37
 It 
seems possible to read in this image both that which for Derrida is a ruin and that which 
Barthes refers to as ‘a temporal hallucination’, where the object in the image is both absent 
and ‘has been’. 
 
In the case of photography, as Derrida notes, it is 'all about the return of the departed';
38
 the 
photograph always contains a trace of the thing that was once there; a trace that, although 
irreducible, is only perceivable between, or at the intertwining of, vision and blindness. In 
                                                
32
 This is to suggest that the photographic process might be embedded with that which led to the origin 
of drawing rather the other way round, which counters Newman’s suggestion that  photography ‘began 
by imitating drawing’.  
33
 Batchen, G (1999), Burning With Desire: The Conception of Photography, MIT Press, USA, p172.  
34
 Derrida’s argument is more fully developed in the book produced to accompany an exhibition he had 
curated at the Louvre in 1990. When planning the theme of this exhibition he played with the name of 
the museum with the phrase “L’ouvre ou on ne pas voir”. See Derrida, J (1993) Memoirs of the Blind, 
The Self Portrait and Other Ruins, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London. 
35
 Jay, M, (1944) Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in 20
th
 Century French Thought, University 
of California, p522 
36
 Ibid. [All the italics in this paragraph are mine.] 
37
 Batchen, G (1999), Burning With Desire: The Conception of Photography, MIT Press, pp157- 173 
38
 Derrida, J. (1988), "The Deaths of Roland Barthes' in Hugh J Silverman, Philosophy and Non-
Philosophy Since Merleau-Ponty, p34 
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other words, for Derrida, the ruin is present in the photographic image as something that, in 
visual terms, is inconsistent; something that hesitates or flickers between the visible and the 
invisible; something that may or may not form into a tangible image or readable thing. This is 
to suggest that what we encounter in the kind of drawing that shares the condition of the 
photograph (or vice versa), is the imprint, trace or shadow of something from which we may 
be excluded, that we cannot properly access, cannot categorise, and therefore cannot ‘see’. 
 
Following this line of thought, Barthes’ idea of encounter as indexical contact with ‘the thing of 
the past’ can be equated, via Derrida’s evocation of the ruin, to blindness. It is this ‘contact’ 
that cuts out or eliminates vision, and therefore the self. Identification, based on seeing and 
naming, is made impossible – there is nothing there on which to base an identification. Thus, 
as Newman has suggested, is a challenge to representation brought about; through the 
photographic process (and that of certain kinds of mark making) a record is made of 'nothing 
there': something either isn't represented or doesn't represent, or remains outside of 
representation altogether, as absence or ruin.
39
 
 
This is interesting to me in relation to the feeling I have that my own practice is based on an 
original encounter with something I cannot quite remember and which, probably, I didn't 
actually ‘see’. To what extent, for instance, did the photographic images of the spider webs 
actually contain (or reflect) in themselves the blindness and memory loss – as ruin of the self 
– that I experienced in relation to them? Entirely missing the message "drugs wreck your 
brain", did I register instead something intrinsic to the photograph that echoed something 
within - as a component of - the self? If so, what is this thing in any representation – directly 
related to my ‘self’ - that is missed, passed over, unseen or invisible? What is it that might be 
present as an absence; both constantly resolving (being 'made' or appearing) and dissolving, 
collapsing into ruin? In the case of photography, as Derrida notes, it is 'all about the return of 
the departed';
40
 the photograph always contains a trace of the thing that was once there; a 
trace that, although irreducible, is only perceivable between, or at the intertwining of, vision 
and blindness. In other words, for Derrida, the ruin is present in the photographic image as 
something that, in visual terms, is inconsistent; something that hesitates or flickers between 
the visible and the invisible; something that may or may not form into a tangible image or 
readable thing. This is to suggest that what we encounter in the kind of drawing that shares 
the condition of the photograph (or vice versa), is the imprint, trace or shadow of something 
from which we may be excluded, that we cannot properly access, cannot categorise, and 
therefore cannot ‘see’. It is to this place - to the trace as ‘flicker’ - that I am drawn as an artist; 
and to the two distinct types of drawing style that occur there: the mark and the scribble.  
 
                                                
39
 Compare Bayard’s action with that of Butades’ daughter. In Bayard’s case he photographs himself as 
shadow – a ghost or shade – and in doing so erases himself. (His self-portrait is as a drowned – and 
therefore absent - man.) 
40
 Derrida, J. (1988), "The Deaths of Roland Barthes' in Hugh J Silverman, Philosophy and Non-
Philosophy Since Merleau-Ponty, p34 
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By mark I mean both that which is indexically linked to something inhuman, outside the range 
of words in a language, but also that which, in contrast, marks out, maps and structures 
space, the mark as diagram, as the 'variations of the subjectifying structure’
41
 that point to - or 
speak of - our position in language. The scribble - perhaps closer to the shadow - is 
everything that falls short of this kind of articulation; where something else, some kind of 
refusal or inability to speak, some fault in speech, is being registered.
42
 The photograph, as 
sign that can be classified as both indexical and symbolic
43
, may be the site at which these 
two ‘drawing’ styles meet. Indeed, as Susan Sontag has noted, there are occasions when the 
photograph can more appropriately be classified as a scribble; in the novels of W. G. Sebald 
for instance. His use of uncaptioned photographic images function, Sontag suggests, 'like the 
squiggles in Tristram Shandy … [as] …insolent challenge to the sufficiency of the verbal.'
44
 It 
seems to me that the "before and after" photographs of the spider webs also demonstrate, 
perhaps even act out, these two positions; one of speech, of the speaking subject, the other 
of something outside of that, something that hovers on the threshold of that which cannot 
register; that is inexpressible, unrepresentable or invisible. This is because, on top of what the 
photograph itself may or may not have pointed out to me about the nature of ‘selfhood’ (and 
its potential absence) the 'image' still remained. Did I see the marks in the photograph, 
particularly in the image of the unmade or ruined web, as some sort of ‘print out’ of the 
spider’s loss of memory; as (in linking memory with selfhood) an indisputable record of its 
non-being? If so, what during the activity of spinning had remained of the spider? What was 
still there, still moving, as empty echo of the ‘web builder’? Perhaps what shocked me, 
evidenced by the photograph of what the spider had ‘drawn’, was the realisation that 
something that I might have assumed had at least some basic level of ‘consciousness’, could 
carry on automatically; weaving, writing, drawing - even after it had ‘lost its head’. 
 
The spider draws the thread from her body.  Her movements are compulsive (she knows not 
what she does) and through these movements she weaves a net; also mnemonic device.  
The net is a trap - she consumes all she catches there. The spider’s web is both her 
habitation and the mark, trace or notation
45
 of her being; through it she can be identified. The 
web is also therefore her self-portrait - a mirror of her presence.
46
 And while it is difficult to 
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 Lacan, J. (1994), The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Penguin, London, p109 
42
 Andrew Brown links the scribble to the psychoanalytic concept of trauma and suggests that both are 
'figures of writing', in which the illegible and inexpressible are somehow preserved. [Brown, A, (2002) 
Roland Barthes: The Figures of Writing, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p278]  
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 Peirce, C.S. (1955) Philosophic Writings of Peirce, Dover Publications, New York, p106 
44
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46
 Continuing along the lines of the previous footnote, this implies that the spider’s ‘presence’, as mirror 
image or self portrait, also contains something ‘received from elsewhere’.  As I will discuss in more detail 
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work out what the scientists performing these experiments thought a spider might have in 
common with a human, for the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, it is more straightforward. 
Memory has its laws – Remembrance, on the other hand, is characterised by its lawlessness, 
its status as something ‘out of bounds’. Thus, like the marks which ‘rain’ from the painters 
brush, what falls from the spider is not the result of a set of decisions, based on knowledge it 
has acquired ‘culturally’; the web is formed, not out of choice, but from what Lacan insists is 
‘something else... If a bird were to paint’, he suggests, ‘would it not be by letting fall its 
feathers, a snake by casting off its scales, a tree by letting fall its leaves?’
47
 What the spider 
does is completely natural - the movement has no relation to any ‘human’ activity.  
 
Note: James Joyce used to do a little dance he called ‘the spider’ whenever he was suffering 
from writer’s block. 
 
And so, although they appear to be the opposite of cultural production (of representations or 
artifice) it might be worth considering the spider web images in relation to the practice of art - 
to consider them, perhaps, as art. Indeed, this depiction or trace
48
 of something like 
'subjective absence', this demonstration of loss of control or 'crisis' of the subject (or of just 
being plain ‘out of it') would not necessarily look out of place in something like George 
Bataille's philosophical/ anthropological journal Documents,
49
 which included reproductions of 
artworks as well as commentary upon them, or in the Surrealist publication Minotaure, where 
Roger Caillois published his famous essay on the Praying Mantis (an insect that can continue 
to perform life-like acts, including the sex act, even after decapitation)
50
  and where Lacan 
published his early study on psychosis, citing the example of the infamous Papin sisters, who 
tore out their employers' eyes.
51
 In other words, this newspaper image of the spider webs 
raises questions about the way in which photography is particularly suited, not just for the 
capturing of events (or 'being') as absence, but to the staging of them also.  Why is this?  Why 
(arguably) would this ‘idea’ not work quite so well as a painting? The answer, as I have 
suggested above, has something to do with the fact that the photograph contains something 
in addition to that which can be classified as an image. The photograph is at once a 
representation and an indexical mark. At once a readable, meaningful, image and therefore a 
part of culture – that which is human - the photograph also contains something that evades all 
                                                                                                                                       
in the second section – under the subheading "I am here" as Photographic Noeme - this applies to any 
attempt at the representation of (self) presence (which is further complicated by the temporal delay 
hinted at by Martin Jay, above) 
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 Lacan, J. (1994), The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Penguin, London, p114 (My 
emphasis). 
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 The spider’s web is not a representation, it is the thing itself. Yet it also ‘depicts’, so it may be quite 
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51
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that: the photograph traps or is imprinted with that which is inhuman. Flickering between the 
visible and the invisible, the photograph confronts us with that within the image itself that is 
unsymbolisable or absent; where an unrepresentable reality, beyond words, co-exists 
alongside that which is recognisable as an image.  
 
Epilogue: Curious to see if this insistent memory was false or real, I recently visited a 
newspaper archive and, after a little detective work, found the original article on microfiche, 
which also gave me the date of the newspaper in which it appeared: October 4
th
 1971. Once I 
had this information I could buy a copy of the paper from one of the many companies that 
stock old newspapers for sale as souvenir or gift. It currently lies on my desk. Here, now, is 
the thing that triggered something then. It is almost a relief to have it at last (for myself). And 
while it is no longer the thing it was, it is all that remains of it. When I look at it I know that 
something of it, something from it (yet other to it) triggered something which echoes within me 
now; something that I claim to remember, indeed cannot forget, even though I cannot bring to 
mind exactly what it was (or is). The newspaper functions merely as evidence, but nothing 
else – it no longer causes any anxiety.
52
 I have the article before me but it does not – or it 
does no longer – catch me out. However, what still interests me about it, and as a theme 
explored in my practice, revolves around the question of how this event, or indeed any event, 
can or cannot be recalled or retold, can or cannot be brought into (spoken, written, pictorial) 
language. What is the relation between this kind of ‘speechlessness’ and photography? 
Photography, as the above discussion indicates, shows us something about the limits of 
representation. Perhaps what photography points to - by replicating this state of affairs - is 
that certain things, even those tied up with something as seemingly real as one's own 
personal history, remain beyond representation, resist integration into language. If so, in what 
way can an artist – especially one whose practice is based (as I claim mine is) on the staging 
or writing of an autobiography - respond to this situation?
53
 
 
Recall: Ruin 
The original event; ‘my’ event - of encountering the photographs of the spider webs - is in the 
past, its expression is in the past ‘perfect’ tense. ‘The past is past’ as Jean-Luc Nancy 
announces
54
. But what of its echo? The past, as Nancy continues, is ‘available to memory 
only on the understanding that memory itself constantly collapses into an immemorial from 
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 To do this, as Barthes notes, the ‘evidential’ needs to be combined with the 'exclamatory…"Ah! 
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54 
Nancy, JL (2003) ‘The Taciturn Eternal Return’ in Tacita Dean: Essays, Steidle, Germany. 
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which nothing returns, ever.’
55
 Is there is no response? Nothing left-over? As Nancy implies, 
what is gone is gone. But what about the use of remembrance – for example in Proust - in 
order to generate a work of art? Is what happens in remembrance beyond memory – 
somehow outside of memory – and also therefore outside of the self, beyond language? The 
past perfect – by which tense I must recall an event that occurred thirty years ago – rightly 
represents, as Nancy insists,  'what has been done, executed, with no possibility of addition 
or extension'. Yet, as Nancy continues, 'it also refers to the irremediable loss whose 
disappearance continues to resonate like the sound of a key dropped into a bottomless well'. 
The essence of this past 'continues unuttered, remains unspoken, which means both that it 
has been passed over in silence (implied? unheard? mute? this goes unsaid) and that it 
consists precisely in staying unspoken.
56
’ If outside of speech, yet nevertheless now, here, 
present, what form can its expression take? Perhaps the remembering of it, as remembrance, 
requires a different tense? 
 
‘The past is past.’ Of course, as Nancy continues, ‘there is such a thing as recall, but “recall” 
itself is a call that clearly has no addressee, that is deprived of a destination.’ For Nancy, ‘the 
recall of the past always opens, irresistibly, onto an endless distance and onto an abyss’.  
Here, ‘two simultaneous testimonies’ are offered: ‘on the one hand, there was this presence 
there; on the other, there is here, now, only the past of the “there was”.’
57
 The context for 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s remarks, above, which evoke Proust’s Remembrance as well as Roland 
Barthes’ meditations on the photograph, is a commentary on the artist Tacita Dean.  Dean 
utilises the medium of film and photography to project relics of the past – ruined buildings, a 
lost boat, some ancient trees – into the present tense.
58
 Indeed, the presence of something 
that is at once past yet insistently here now – with this, surely, a contradiction - something 
that perhaps counters speech - is, as Barthes insists, ‘the very essence’ of the photograph
59
. 
The past of the photograph occurs as a disturbance in the present; through, as Barthes 
observes, a ‘superimposition’. As a layering over and possible disfiguring or marking of one 
thing by another, the past coexists with and is, as it were, seared by 'reality' which has, it 
seems, a complicated relation to the present; is the ‘not past’ bit of the photograph. [I]n 
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Photography', as Barthes writes, 'I can never deny that the thing has been there. And this 
thing, from which the image is cast, is, as Barthes insists, both 'irrefutably present, and yet 
already deferred'. As a real thing combined with a temporal delay; 'photography can be 
expressed’, reduced to, the "That-has-'been." Barthes designates a word for this unit of 
language; it is Photography's noeme; a term that evokes ‘name’ but evades it also.
60
 
 
The past is past. Yet the photograph problematises this perfect, simple, 'past-ness'. As 
'irrefutable record' of something that was there, nevertheless the photograph cannot remain in 
the past. As 'reality in the past state [it is] at once the past and the real.'
61
 In addition, as 
Barthes claims, the photograph has the capacity to puncture the experience of looking with 
something immediate, something that prevents it from being consigned to history, something 
outside or in excess of that which is channelled through social, cultural, discourse: a ‘detail’, 
simultaneously ‘detonator‘, ‘explosion’, ‘the passage of a void’. This private, subjective 
encounter that is untranslatable (neither transformable nor transferable), that is a 
confrontation with a ‘partial object’, linked to the self-image,
62
 Barthes labels the Punctum. 
The Punctum, Barthes suggests, is close to ‘what Lacan calls the Tuche, the occasion, the 
Encounter’
63
; it captures something real in a contingent detail. It also, as I will discuss in more 
depth later, punctuates that which would otherwise be meaningless or, rather, outside of 
meaning altogether; it hints at an intimate, private grammar that directs meaning away from 
any shared discourse and towards something that is aimed at the individual - like an arrow. In 
Barthes analysis, the Punctum of the photograph is outside history, beyond that which 
cultural. It is also in some way outside of vision - ‘once there is a Punctum, a blind field is 
created’
64
 - as well as unavailable to speech: ‘words fail’.
65
 
 
As ‘the return of what cannot come again’
66
, might Jean-Luc Nancy’s ‘recall’ be equated with 
Barthes' Punctum; with the contingent detail of a photographic moment? Both 'recall' and 
Punctum combine a temporal paradox (Barthes’ simultaneity of the past and the real, Nancy’s 
‘here, now, there is only the past of the there was’) with a difficulty of representation, a failure 
of language. Writing on the subject of remembering, and basing their discussions around a 
confrontation with the photographic medium, both Nancy and Barthes evoke a kind of infinite 
repetition or emptiness; Nancy describes it as ‘an echo without sound’; Barthes as a ‘floating 
flash [that] cries out in silence.’ Is this problematisation of remembrance bound up, therefore, 
with the idea that it has something in common with the operation of the photograph? That 
remembrance is itself in some way ‘photographic’? If so, might the common factor be, as 
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Nancy asserts, that the recalled event cannot be spoken? Is there a relation  - a fundamental 
incompatibility - between the photographic and speech? ‘The photograph does not call up the 
past’, Barthes states, and adds, in parenthesis, that there is ‘nothing Proustian in a 
photograph
67
’. However, it triggers remembrance, ‘just as Proust experienced it one day in an 
involuntary and complete memory.’
68
 This apparent contradiction underpins the distinction 
that Barthes is making between remembrance and memory, a distinction which echoes that 
drawn between the photograph as ‘Studium’
69
 (everything that is learnt, received, from 
culture) and the photographic Punctum - everything outside of that. It also hints at another 
opposition, that between modes of remembering and forms of forgetting.
70
  
 
The Camera: Language and Photography’s “Disturbance” 
The difference between memory, bound up with selfhood - with one’s self image and the 
identity you have constructed for yourself - and remembrance (which, as I will argue, is 
connected to the individual but outside of any culturally processed narrative, is in fact outside 
any mode of representation at all) can be considered in relation to the tripartite structure 
through which, in Lacanian terms, the subject experiences the world; through the opposition 
that Lacan makes between the Symbolic and Imaginary registers and that of the Real. 
Essential to being, the Real is nevertheless inassimilable to any system of representation or 
expression and is therefore beyond the realm of the other two registers. Interestingly, in the 
section headed ‘The Topic of the Imaginary’
71
, from Seminar One, Lacan proposes the 
camera as a model for understanding the Symbolic system. The way a camera works and the 
objects (images) it produces could be considered as equivalent to the system of language, to 
the way that language generates meaningful things – in the form of words, for example. In 
this seminar Lacan stresses the importance of the Symbolic in allowing something imaginary 
to appear ‘in the world’. As he points out, the difference between an objective thing and a 
subjective image is not always obvious. He reminds us of the sight of a rainbow, which differs 
from a photograph of a rainbow. A rainbow is not a tangible thing, it is just an illusion, a virtual 
image; there is nothing to which the rainbow corresponds in reality. However, the camera 
reads it as something objective, it converts it into a thing. Like the camera, language also 
leads to the creation of apparently objective images. Language, like the camera, can make an 
‘object’ out of something that exists only as an idea, a subjective image, concept or fantasy.  
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In order to demonstrate the importance of the Symbolic position for the Subject, Lacan 
introduces the experiment ‘of the inverted bouquet’. 
 
 
 
 
 
As he explains: ‘A spherical mirror produces a real image. To each point of a light ray 
emanating from any point on an object placed at a certain distance, preferably in the plane of 
the sphere's centre, there corresponds, in the same plane, through the convergence of the 
rays reflected on the surface of the sphere, another luminous point - which yields a real image 
of the object.’
72
 Bearing this in mind, Lacan asks his students to imagine that they have in 
front of them a box, hollow on one side, placed on a stand, at the centre of the mirrored half-
sphere. ‘On the box’, suggests Lacan, ‘you will place a vase, a real one. Beneath it, there is a 
bouquet of flowers. So, what is happening? The bouquet is reflected in the spherical surface, 
meeting at the symmetrical point of luminosity. Consequently, a real image is formed’;
73
 an 
image consisting of the reflection of the bouquet of flowers that, combined with the real vase, 
appears as a bunch of flowers in a vase. But this image can only seen from the correct 
viewing position, where the rays of light from the mirror converge. Lacan uses this experiment 
to explain the conjunction of the Real and the Imaginary; to get an image, you need to include 
something of the Real within it – and the eye needs to be in a certain position from which to 
see this image. In terms of language, meaning, this position corresponds to that provided by 
the Symbolic, by the subject’s entry into language and, subsequently, the world of speech.  
 
In Lacan’s model, an image consists of the Real and the Imaginary plus the Symbolic, which 
puts the eye into the correct position to see it. Indeed, the experiment offers an analogy for 
the way that - although it is never directly accessible - we can form an image of the Real. The 
Imaginary is understood as the container for the Real and vice versa, with an image - an 
identifiable signifying thing - only possible when the subject takes up a certain position. The 
eye in the diagram above can therefore be substituted for the  ‘I’ in language; the Subject that 
                                                
72
 Ibid., p77 
73
 Ibid., p77-78 
 22 
has taken up a position in the Symbolic order. If you don’t have this position, then you are not 
a Subject. The ability to adopt a Symbolic position, to take a place in language, means “I’ve 
got an image”, and the chaotic impulses - the stuff from the Real - beyond our control or 
access, can be contained by this image and mastered. The Real – as the cause of desire at 
the heart of language - can never be symbolised. If we encountered it directly it would be 
deadly; annihilating our self image, it would put us back into an undifferentiated world. As 
Lacan suggests, ‘for there to be an illusion, for there to be a world constituted, in front of the 
eye looking, in which the Imaginary can include the Real and, by the same token, fashion it, in 
which the Real also can include and, by the same token, locate the Imaginary, one condition 
must be fulfilled - as I have said, the eye must be in a specific position, it must be inside the 
cone [the rays of light that converge to form the image]. If it is outside this cone, it will no 
longer see what is imaginary, for the simple reason that nothing from the cone of emission will 
happen to strike it. It will see things in their real state, entirely naked, that is to say, inside the 
mechanism, a sad, empty pot, or some lonesome flowers, depending on the case.’
74
  
 
The optical image, as real thing created by the lens, parallels the ‘real thing’ created by 
language such as a name or word. The naming of things, this division of the world into 
separate identifiable things simultaneously creates a relation to the subject of an Other, who 
is recognised as such. I will return later to the relation that language has to the ‘call’ to the 
Other, however the comments above lead to a consideration of the ways in which a human 
being can perhaps fail to take up the ‘correct’ position in the Symbolic order, and also to the 
suggestion that this position - the only one from which to speak - is not always an ideal or a 
comfortable one. Finally, we should also note that Lacan’s experiment doesn't describe the 
photograph, the photographic print. As Barthes couldn't stop noticing, the photograph is not 
'just' an image – it is also an imprint of a real thing. Some sort of residue, or stain. What you 
see in the photograph, he argues, is not a mirror image (it has not been mediated through the 
Symbolic, or at least not entirely). The photograph reveals something to us, but what it points 
to is nothing other than a mode of looking that is empty. The camera’s ‘look’ is a look that 
doesn’t see. In this way, photography causes a rupture of selfhood, between the image of the 
self and its imprint (by doubling, not mirroring) which can threaten or overwhelm the subject. 
Indeed it is only since the photograph that we glimpse this double as it appears ‘entirely 
naked’; unfiltered by the Symbolic. 
 
Anxiety  
Roland Barthes published Camera Lucida in 1980. (Shortly after it appeared in the bookshops 
he was killed in a car accident.) Written in the aftermath of his mother's death in 1977, the 
book, as Graham Allen suggests, could perhaps be regarded as 'a wholly personal discourse 
of mourning'
75
 with this over and above its role as a text on which to reliably build a theory of 
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photography. However, it is important to note that the book was also written in the wake of 
Barthes' 1977-78 seminar, The Neutral, and would have taken shape within the time frame of 
his following seminar, Preparation of the Novel. The 'Neutral', as Rosalind Krauss asserts, 
was not a new concept for Barthes but a return to what she proposes as his fundamental  
'fantasy' (located, perhaps, in his search for a "third language"); to which his teaching had 
‘held steady’ from its beginnings; in a 'trajectory that took him from Writing Degree Zero, with 
the zero degree an early version of "le neutre", through all the rest of his books.'
76
 In 
Preparation… Barthes expressed a desire to make the transition from 'notation’ to ‘novel'
77
 
laying bare his desire in a lecture delivered at the College de France in October 1978, the title 
of which ‘Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure’, directly quotes the opening 
sentence of Proust's A La Recherché Du Temps Perdue.  Situated in these contexts, Camera 
Lucida could therefore be regarded as a textual synthesis of the desire to write novelistically 
(to write fiction) and the desire to produce a new ('Third') form (which would itself have some 
critical currency). As I will argue, however, Barthes was also looking for a form that would 
somehow echo the operation of the photograph. Indeed the book, as he maintains from the 
start, is triggered by a feeling that, for him, the as yet unidentified 'essential feature' that 
distinguishes photography from any other type of image - yet which also makes it 
'unclassifiable' - corresponded to a discomfort he had 'always suffered' in regard to his 
position within language; the place from which he felt able to speak. Perhaps the position (as 
a writer) that he had found himself in when he came to write Camera Lucida conflicted with 
the ‘fantasy’ hinted at by Krauss; a conflict that, as he himself confesses early on in the text, 
he experiences as an 'uneasiness… of being torn between two languages, one expressive, 
the other critical.'
78
 Barthes identifies something within the photograph (within the operation of 
photography) that echoes this discomfort, this impediment to free speech – a speech that, in 
the ideal world, might combine the two languages and enable him to speak with both; to 
speak with two voices simultaneously; the general, shared, voice of culture, from which his 
criticism emerges or is formed, and the singular expressive voice, something that resists the 
already spoken aspect of culture that causes his unease.
79
 That, for Barthes, the essential 
feature of the photograph can be linked to something connected to the self; to the fantasy, 
suggests that Camera Lucida has a third component; one that consists of a theory of the 
subject while being also a performance of subjectivity; of being trapped in language. Indeed, 
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as Beryl Schlossman suggests, in Barthes’ writing, ‘the luxury (and the artifice) of language 
coincides with a theatre of subjectivity and the staging of desire.’
80
 
 
Another context for Barthes book on photography is the psychoanalytic-based theory of 
Jacques Lacan of which Barthes makes extensive use, quoting directly from Lacan’s 1964 
seminar (XI) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.
81
 Barthes was a regular 
attendee of Lacan’s seminars and, again in the opening pages of Camera Lucida, he aligns 
his reaction to photography as ’Encounter’ with the Lacanian concept of the Real.
82
 However, 
although this lies outside the scope of this thesis, it seems to me that Camera Lucida could 
be very productively read through Lacan’s preceding Seminar (X), on Anxiety, and read as an 
anxious text, as the writing of anxiety, and this is because of the particular things that Barthes 
has to say in relation to his self image which appears to undergo a crisis after his mothers 
death. This crisis is made all the more apparent to Barthes when he confronts a photograph: 
(almost) any photograph. Something intrinsic to the photograph means that his questions 
about loss become questions about the photograph (and vice versa) and thereby bring his 
book into being. His mother’s death led him to think about photography, her death was the 
‘thread’ which drew him to a consideration of the photograph.
83
  This crisis also precipitates a 
change in Barthes’ use of the first person. Denis Hollier has pointed out that Barthes initially 
started to use the “I” from ‘the safe ground of linguistic theory’ (influenced by Jakobson and 
Benveniste). Barthes started to speak from the autobiographical first person precisely, Hollier 
argues, ‘because there was no risk of succeeding at it.’ Barthes strategy of aligning ‘the 
articulation of autobiography with the dialectic of games and rules’ was, as Hollier continues, 
‘to ensure …that the “I” would keep its linguistic status as empty sign… as if linguistics could 
perform a quasi-surgical clearing of the first person of any psychological mucus and 
substitute the semantic emptiness of the shifter (not dissimilar to the neutral emptiness of 
Robbe–Grillet’s world) for the imaginary fullness of the person.’
 84
 But having abandoned his 
position as a ‘Semiologist’ and having himself been abandoned through the death of 
someone on whom, as becomes apparent after reading the book, his self image greatly 
depended, the ground on which Camera Lucida was written seems more shaky. This change 
of usage becomes clear when it is compared with the performance of the ‘I’ in Barthes’ A 
Lovers Discourse. At the start of this book he states that he is writing in the first person, ‘in 
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order to stage an utterance’: to simulate, not simply describe, ‘the site of someone 
speaking.’
85
 This is a ‘structural’ portrait – Barthes interest is in how something, rather than 
what, is expressed - in this case by the lover when, ‘within himself, amorously’ he is 
‘confronting the Other (the loved object), who does not speak.’
86
 Three years later, in the 
shadow of the lost object - after his mother’s death - he comes to write his book on 
photography. The ‘I’ is still there but, clearly mirroring the photographic object - itself no more 
than a ‘weightless transparent envelope’
87
 - the first person has become the site of a collapse. 
What has caused this emptiness, this collapse?  This is the question that Barthes explores in 
his book, and clearly it is related to the loss, to the absence, of the other. ‘An identification’, 
Lacan suggests, ‘takes place in the subject when he assumes an image’,
88
 but it is in relation 
to the Other that the image of the self, and therefore the self ‘itself’, is housed.  The anxiety 
photography produces is connected to the way in which a photograph exposes us to an 
unfiltered reality from which the Other, and therefore the self, is absent. This opens up the 
question as to who we are, as with no Other we are nothing.  
 
The final comment to make in relation to Camera Lucida (as I will be drawing on this text 
throughout this piece of writing) is that Barthes also saturates this book with quotes from, as 
well as commentary upon, Proust. Camera Lucida is most widely known as the book in which 
Barthes formulates his concept or idea of the Punctum, defined above, with which he 
opposes the Studium, ‘which doesn’t mean, at least not immediately, “study”, but application 
to a thing… a kind of general, enthusiastic commitment’
89
 to something. However, as 
mentioned above, due to the fact that the Punctum can not be reduced to any one particular, 
citable, definition but on the contrary, as James Elkins points out, marks that which is 
'idiosyncratic, unpredictable, or essentially incommunicable'
90
, the viability of the Punctum as 
a basis for theory is arguable
91
. Yet there is something (which is also of relevance to my 
practice) to which the idea of the Punctum is inextricably tied and that may be more 
productively built upon. This is Barthes’ particular discourse on memory in relation to 
selfhood. For Barthes, both memory and the ‘self’ contain an element of that which is 
unpredictable and incommunicable. By exploring his use of the Proustian term anamnesis, 
which Barthes opposes with ecmnesia,
92
 I believe that it is possible to map out a field that 
synthesises Proust's 'remembrance' and Lacan's Real and locates subjectivity as intermittent: 
a fluctuation between absence and presence, between a coherent, if alienating, self image 
that is underpinned, held in place, by the other and nothing. Here might also reside the idea 
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of a possible  'between state' (as 'blank', 'neutral', or ‘degree zero’) that is neither self nor 
other yet, as threshold, boundary, mark or limit, is that on which the self is hinged and at 
which artists might direct their practice.  
 
Towards the end of Camera Lucida Barthes describes the photographic affect as ‘ecmnesic’, 
thereby associating the encounter, as Punctum, with a kind of memory loss and one that, as 
argued above, is linked to its opposite: involuntary recollection. Barthes seems to make the 
link between involuntary recollection and selective forgetting in relation to the famous (never 
reproduced) “Winter Garden” photograph of his mother; the one that offers him the 'truth of 
the face I had loved'
93
. For once, he writes, 'photography gave me a sentiment as certain as 
remembrance', that is - he adds - memory that is always 'involuntary'.
94
 As a kind of 
ecmnesia, then, involuntary memory, as Barthes (following Proust) asserts, can be equated 
with a loss of selfhood, and with the blank at which this thesis is aimed. Barthes’ Punctum – 
as something to which this blank might have an affinity  - is, as he insists, not a memory. It is 
in fact opposed to memory, or at least to a mnemonics. For Barthes (maintaining a 
connection between the photographic affect and memory loss) it is the difference between an 
anamnesis and that which is ecmnesic, as discussed above. One of these terms designates a 
form of remembering, the other a mode of forgetting. An anamnesis is concerned with 
memory, not remembrance. Its task, that of memorising, usually takes the form of a spoken 
account linked to the subject’s self-image. An anamnesis is the story the subject tells him or 
herself, an oral narrative that, like a list of symptoms, describes how s/he came to ‘be’. An 
anamnesis seeks coherence. Tied up with ritual, it can be taught and recited, played out, 
acted or staged. An anamnesis makes the body stick together as an image, it maps us out, 
gives us our relative position in the world, tells us our history. Through this memorisation, 
grounded in speech, we construct our self-image. Remembrance punctures this story while 
remaining outside it - it ‘blocks memory’, obscures vision, ‘quickly becomes a counter 
memory’.
95
 Out of bounds, remembrance is fragmentary, disordered. It triggers something in 
the body that displaces or subtracts from selfhood. Simultaneously, however (through the 
Punctum for example) it points to something that is in excess of it. Remembrance splits, 
shatters, the self image, but it leaves a remainder. It takes away from memory (after looking 
at some photographs Barthes says he has no memories left) but also, by blocking cultural 
assimilation (the photograph cannot be transformed, sublimated), it points towards something 
else, something outside and in addition to the self. What is recognised in the photographic 
Punctum, as Barthes suggests, is ‘a kind of intractable supplement of identity’. This has 
something to do with the tense of remembrance, which differs from that of memory. As Jean-
Luc Nancy has suggested, ‘the remembrance of things past is a loss of time that will never be 
compensated’
96
. In the instant of remembrance, then, time drops away. What lacks in the 
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present is the past. What I am trying to suggest here is that the photographic operation of 
remembrance, as lack in the present, coincides with a blanking out, a brief disappearance of 
the self – without memories - into pure presence.  
 
Consciousness 
In her book Unspeakable Sentences,
97
 the writer Ann Banfield draws our attention to an 
interesting fact. She argues that the invention of the lens brought about the realisation that 
there were moments or places within which one could, as Proust affirms, become witness, 'a 
spectator… of one's own absence'.
98
 Banfield identifies the tracing of this in concurrent 
literature, especially the novel; with this paradoxical situation being of particular interest to the 
novelist Virginia Woolf. In Woolf’s novel The Waves, one question is repeatedly formulated: 
'how describe the world seen without a self?'
99
, It is this question – prompted, as Banfield 
argues, by the encounter with the photograph – that produced a new kind of sentence 
construction; one in which the ‘I’ is absent.
100
 This is to suggest that Woolf’s written, 
novelistic, sentence echoes the operation of photography.
101
  
 
I will return to this below. However, in her discourse on sentences that are ‘unspeakable’ – 
i.e. possible only in writing - Ann Banfield also comments, through Barthes, on the relation 
between the photograph and involuntary recollection - what she terms  'unremembered 
memory'. This is also equated with something that resides outside conventionalised meaning; 
as something inassimilable to the subject. 'The link Camera Lucida makes between death and 
the contingency of the observer’, she writes, ‘has a literary precedent, “The Intermittences of 
the Heart” in Cities of the Plain, in whose dream sequence the dead return.’
102
 ‘The properties 
Barthes finds in the photograph can be glossed by those Proust finds in the return of the past 
in the form of involuntary memory… [and] “Involuntary”’, as Banfield insists, ‘means what 
escapes the control of the subject’s desire and is in that sense unintended... Thus, involuntary 
memory is as much independent of the conscious mind as the photographic image. This 
independence’, Banfied continues, ‘can be seen as equivalent to the forgetfulness that 
surrounds the memories only brought back involuntarily, creating an unremembered past 
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outside of the ‘I’ ’s present memory. The “intermittences” of the heart in question are 
governed by this independence of certain memories from the mind’.
 103
 ‘The precondition to 
the separateness of these experiences, Banfield argues, ‘is the forgetting of them; nothing 
can return as involuntary memory that has not first been forgotten… [that] inhabit(s) a region 
where there are no conscious human nervous systems to experience it, whether  that region 
is in the unconscious or in a pile of photographs in a drawer.’ 
104
  
 
Yet this kind of forgetting, as something never remembered in the first place and which 
coincides with a loss of selfhood, is also a moment of pure consciousness – of being. This is 
what Barthes is trying to describe in relation to his encounter with the photograph. 
Furthermore, this intermittence between ‘being’ (i.e. forgetting) and ‘remembering’ echoes 
Freud's observation that 'becoming conscious and leaving behind memory traces are 
processes incompatible with each other within one and the same system… conscious arises 
instead of a memory trace.'
105
 In other words, you can't have both operations going on at the 
same time. All memory traces are afterthoughts – there is no symbolisation in the present 
tense. An illustration of the incompatibility between consciousness and remembering which 
also demonstrates how selfhood – an identity - depends on a memory of the past, can be 
found in Deborah Wearing's recent account of her husband's tragic illness, which had 
resulted in profound brain damage and almost total memory loss.
106
 While her husband has a 
general idea who he (and his wife) is, he is unable to memorise events as they happen, 
although he undoubtedly experiences them for extremely short periods of time (usually no 
more than a few seconds). Because of this, Wearing describes her husband as living entirely 
in the present. Yet this is a state that he struggles against. What particularly interested me 
about this story was the fact that Clive Wearing started to write a diary in which, against the 
time slots allocated in the diary each day, he records an endless series of identical 
statements that repeatedly assert that he is alive, awake, for the first time “NOW!”. But each 
moment is immediately forgotten, as evidenced by each statement that follows the last, its 
predecessor becoming only ever then, a location or tense – i.e. the past – that is inaccessible 
to him. These moments of being are traced by their endless replacement, in their unstoppable 
sequence, by the next ‘now’ that is, or already has been, forgotten immediately. Clive 
Wearing's diary entries index the failure of his memory; no new, permanent, memories are 
recorded - either there or in the brain. In fact his day to day experience is neither remembered 
nor forgotten - there is simply no memory at all;. This connects to something that Barthes has 
noticed about the photograph; it ‘mechanically reproduces to infinity [what] has occurred only 
once’. This is a mechanical repetition ‘that could never be repeated existentially’; an action 
that he links, at the end of his book, to a kind of madness – or death. 
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In comparison, the fictional character in Debra Deans’ novel, mentioned above in relation to 
my argument about the character of ecmnesia, is an elderly woman suffering from 
Alzheimer’s. She is departing from life in a ‘wrenching series of separations’, or ’blanks’, when 
memory and therefore her self – who she is – falls away, evaporates. Yet where she goes in 
her imagination is not ‘nowhere’, but to the empty galleries of the Hermitage where she 
worked as a guide when she was a young woman. Once all the works had been transported 
to safety at the start of the second world war, Maria spent the Siege of Leningrad piecing 
together her former route through the collection; in other words, in that empty space, she built 
a memory theatre. This now comes back to her in her illness. Here, in the present, her reality 
is constructed out of absences from the past; it is based on what she put into the empty 
spaces in the Hermitage that had been left behind once the pictures had been removed and 
which, in relation to the confusing, fragmentary, details of the here and now, trigger 
epiphanies - moments of pure being. She experiences only the present but is not ‘there’ in 
relation to anybody else (or even her self). Since she has lost her memory, she ‘exists’ only 
as a receiver of sensations - not as a recording device. What the author of this novel is 
describing is an (albeit fictional) depiction of pure consciousness.  As her illness progresses, 
what the character in Dean’s novel becomes increasingly absorbed by are the things that she 
sees in the present but does not assign to language; things she does not give a place or 
name to, that she does not locate in relation to other things and that float in fact in a kind of 
wordlessness. She merely stares at whatever catches her eye, such as dust floating in a ray 
of light. In relation to these thoughts, it is interesting to return to the observations of Ann 
Banfield, who discuses the relation between a sort of unseeing recording eye in the novel – 
which she defines as an unoccupied subject position - and the ‘impersonal subjectivity’ 
reflected in the photograph.  This, she states, ‘Lacan saw as well [in Seminar Two], and if the 
mirror is for him the model of the imaginary, its reflecting surface is in no way dependent on 
the existence of an observer.’
107
  
 
Imagine that all mankind has disappeared from the earth. I say mankind, given the high value 
placed upon consciousness… What remains in the mirror? But let us go so far as to imagine 
all living beings have vanished. …The reflection in the mirror, the reflection in the lake – do 
they still exist? It is plain that they still exist. And for this very simple reason – at the advanced 
stage of civilization to which we have arrived, which much surpasses our illusions about 
consciousness, we have built machines which we can without the least implausibility imagine 
complicated enough to develop film by themselves… Every living creature having vanished, 
the camera can still record the reflection of the mountain in the lake or that of the Café de 
Flore crumbling into dust in total solitude.
108
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The Mark 
In her essay on the art ‘of erasing art’, Bianca Theisen suggests that because of its arbitrary, 
subjective and contingent nature, alongside the fact that it ‘reappears’ in the present (it is 
recognised by the viewer), Barthes’ Punctum can be linked to the retroactive temporality of 
the traumatic moment. It therefore, ‘does not refer to something that was actually there’.
109
 
According to Freud’s theory of belatedness, Trauma has not actually happened but has 
instead been constructed - after the ‘fact’ - through an incident in the present that gives an 
earlier one a traumatic character. Similarly, Theisen argues, reference in the photographic 
Punctum [that which the viewer recognises] ‘is constructed …it is contingent on 
observation’.
110
 As encounter with  ‘the This ...what Lacan calls the Tuche, the occasion, the 
Encounter, the Real,' Barthes’ Punctum is equated with ‘void’
111
. Outside of culture, the 
experience of the Punctum coincides with a (temporary) blindness. The Punctum is therefore 
unobservable; it is, as Theisen argues, photography’s wordless, ‘unrepresentable blind spot 
to which photography, as a language of deixis and indexicalisation, can only refer as to its 
own operation of reference.’
 112
 In this way, Theisen re-iterates that what I am identifying as 
the photographic operation of remembrance (ie something like Barthes’ Punctum) is opposed 
to memory. It ‘cannot be a form of memory’, she argues, because its detail, ‘linked to the 
temporality of the trauma’, refers to something that is not really there.  
 
On the side of culture, Barthes sees memory as ‘outside of individual time’, and as the 
‘substitute for life.’
113
 For Barthes memory regulates “being’”. In front of a photograph, 
however, we are offered something else. Instead of taking the well worn, ‘nostalgic path’ of 
memory, we could, he argues, plunge for that of ‘certainty’; an identification with the thing in 
the image that has not been there, that cannot be shared or processed culturally. In this way 
remembrance approaches madness; by taking this route you are identifying or merging with 
an absence, yet, for Barthes it is an ecmnesic madness ‘as a guarantee of Being’
114
 – 
essential to it. Contemporary anxiety, triggered by an apparent increase in diseases such as 
Alzheimer’s, focuses on the capacity of the subject to remember; on the problem of 
forgetfulness. This is an anxiety which may be directly related to, possibly even triggered by, 
the realisation that there is something at fault with all recording devices (including sound, 
video and film as well as photography, but also digital devices that produce images or print 
outs). This, despite the pervasive use of these systems for the documentation of events and 
the collection of evidence (including a subject’s personal history) as well as in virtually all 
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contemporary systems of communication and surveillance. This is not because these devices 
don’t capture it ‘all’ but because they point out  – as we look at them - that there is something 
else in the image generated, something beyond, in visual terms, what has been recorded, i.e. 
beyond what the data purports to show. As the artists and writers that I am interested in 
repeatedly confirm (and I will discuss some examples below), what the photographic 
apparatus appears to ‘show’ is in fact contingent on individual interpretation which generates 
multiple and mutable perspectives, endlessly variable and conflicting versions of events, 
endless ‘observations of observations’
115
 as mise-en-abymes with seemingly no single, 
authentic, point of origin.
116
 It seems that some other method or technique might be needed in 
order to record or gain access to the truth. Strange, then, that – as Barthes sees it - it is only 
through the Punctum, the contradictory “This”, where “This” is equated with void;
117
 with 
emptiness, with the thing not there, that the individual subject comes face to face with his or 
her only certainty; one that is also forgotten.  
 
And so it seems that what I remember - photographically - of the spider web images is 
actually something imaginary or phantasmagoric that has nothing to do with the actual image, 
which I can easily bring to mind. Years ago, I encountered, through remembrance, something 
that was missing – and always was - from the actual image. What I encounter now was never 
there then, and what I encountered then was not actually there when I first saw it. In these 
terms, to have a ‘photographic’ memory (as compared to a normal one, perhaps) does not 
simply mean that in the event of an ‘encounter’ you have the ability to automatically record 
everything there in front of you, but that, in doing so, you add a little bit of your own to the 
scene.
118
 It is this extra, imaginary
119
, bit that you encounter through remembrance; indeed 
that triggers remembrance. To have a photographic memory means to go beyond memory, 
and with this addition, as Barthes, through Lacan, has suggested, the subject brushes against 
the Real. Furthermore, through this direct contact with this something that is not there, yet 
that appears to relate to a past experience, the subject is, retroactively, marked. I marked 
(noticed, recognised) the spider’s web and that image instantly and ever afterwards marked 
me. Indeed, my subjectivity hangs upon it.
120
 As Andrew Brown has pointed out, ‘the effect of 
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Barthes’  “detail” ‘is to pierce; Barthes talks of it as a “seductive wound”.’
121
 The event, as 
photographic encounter, then, is also a form of self-wounding; it rends. By a process of 
addition a small part of you is cut (as in deleted). It slips out of sight. This is what comes back 
from the image, returns to, or haunts, the image. Both surplus and remainder, it is what is left 
over by the image and what can be equated, perhaps, with what Jean-Luc Nancy offers as 
the stubborn, tacit operation of the past’s eternal echo.
122
 It is also why, echoing the opening 
sequence of Chris Markers film La Jetée, I state that I was 'marked' by the spider web 
images. To be marked means to be picked out, differentiated; but also to be doomed. To be a 
marked man could mean that you were being watched or hunted, that before long – like the 
trauma - something would catch up with you. To be marked might therefore mean that your 
time was already 'up'. The idea that I was marked by these images, and thereby shaped by 
them, could also imply that what drives my practice is a compulsion to repeatedly restage the 
event, perhaps in order to get a proper look ‘this time’. Something of the image or event might 
be branded into me, might be a component of my identity, yet while this may be essential to 
my idea of self, it is also, as in the trauma, inassimilable to it. Encountered through 
remembrance, it is a mark that that the self has no memory of. How I might think about this 
mark, how I might try to explore it or ‘use’ it in my own practice perhaps, is a question to 
which I will return below. 
 
The Cry 
Photography states Barthes, is ‘never distinguished from its referent’
123
. What it indexes is 
unrepresentable and leaves us lost for words.  Equated with the hallucination, this is the 
presence of something uncanny; the presence of an absence. As Barthes suggests, we know 
that the photograph is not an illusion but - as in our worst nightmares - its opposite. The thing 
in the photographic image has been there and is back now. In this way, remembrance, as a 
moment when one forgets oneself, is therefore also linked with death. For Barthes, 'death is 
the eidos'
124
 of the photograph that he is looking for.  An eidolon, then, is what he wants; a 
photograph that delivers a spectre, a phantom - but also an idealised image. Barthes does 
not want one of those photographs 'before which one recalls less of [the beloved] than by 
merely thinking of him or her'
125
 Barthes’ choice of words here is significant. An eidetic image 
can refer to a (recollected) mental image that has unusual vividness and detail, as if it was 
actually visible, present. This links the phenomenon of a lack in the present  - the presence of 
something that is not actually there - to that of the hallucination or double. To return to 
Theisen’s argument that the Punctum ‘redefines photographic reference’ so that the referent 
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is the thing that isn’t there,
126
 the logical response would be to ask what is. What is there 
instead? Might something be evoked to take its place? For Barthes it is the undead. 
Remembrance, like the Punctum - considered as Punctum - is a kind of ‘temporal 
hallucination’
127
, an eidolon, therefore, coming from without. Like the trauma, it is both certain 
and wounding. Most important for me is the sense this idea gives of something connected to 
a wordless pre-history from which, as subjects, we are both excluded (it is in the past) and 
haunted by (in the present). It seems as if that what Barthes has noticed, which my 
experience in front of the spider web photographs bares out, is that photographic images can 
terrify in ways that differ from reactions triggered by other forms of representation. So is there 
something lacking in the photograph, some necessary thing that might protect or shield us 
from - provide a veil against - naked reality? Actually, Barthes argues that there is too much in 
the photograph. ‘This very special image [Barthes refers to photography’s ‘Totality-of-Image’] 
gives itself out as complete, integral… The photographic image is full, crammed: no room, 
nothing can be added to it.’
128
 Now, it seems, there is no lack.
129
 There is even something of a 
disorder for Barthes - perhaps related to its “too full-ness” - a 'profound madness' that is at the 
core of this ‘photography’,
130
 which he, like those who first encountered it, cannot name, 
cannot classify, cannot put away.  The photograph ‘evades’ definition. Photography’s 
disturbance – ie that it is disturbed – lies in the way that it doesn’t conform; it cannot be 
satisfactorily filed under one category or another. Yet it copies perfectly that which it ‘takes’ – 
so what is wrong? Perhaps it is a question of the too perfect replica? Perhaps photography, 
fatally, lacks a flaw.  
 
In the case of Barthes’ own photograph (the photographic image of himself) the ‘distortion 
between certainty and oblivion’ gives him ‘vertigo’; a kind of ‘anguish’
131
 Anxiety, bound up 
with the double, the alienating self as other, is the flip side of remembrance. Through this 
misrecognition, the self is threatened. In the Winter Garden photograph the ‘certainty’ of 
recognition is important for Barthes because it confirms his self image. What he must see in 
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the image of his mother, recognise in her, is what she saw in him. He needs to see the look 
she gave him, by which he knows he exists. Barthes’ experience is similar to the fictional one 
in Proust
132
 where the narrator discovers, faced with a photograph of his grandmother, ‘a 
perspective on a world which continues in his absence’ As Ann Banfield suggests,  ‘in the 
blankness of [his grandmother’s look in the photograph] all necessity of his existence in her 
eyes vanishes.’
133
 What is important about the Winter Garden photograph is that Barthes 
(re)discovers his mother’s expression, her ‘unique’
134
 mode of being. He needs this as 
testimony of her love for him – of her look for him – as without this ‘nothing will remain but an 
indifferent nature’.
135
 Yet it is this look that, as Barthes also asserts, has been altered by 
photography. Photography’s ‘disturbance (to civilisation)’, is that, since this ‘new action’ one 
can 'see oneself (differently from in a mirror)
136
. Photography disrupts the image of self, it 
heralds 'the advent of myself as other’ (but with no other to confirm your self image, to name 
the bits that are ‘you’
137
). Bound up with the look, it is this hallucinatory nature that, for 
Barthes, is at the root of photography's danger, photography’s ‘madness’.
138
  
 
There is a difference, however, between what Barthes finds uncanny or 'mad', and what 
Lacan posits as an essential operation in becoming human. The ‘advent of the self as other’ 
is, for Lacan, fundamental in the constitution of the ego, to the subject’s point of entry into the 
symbolic system that is language. As discussed above, in Seminar One (1953-54)
139
 Lacan 
describes how the subject moves out of reality, ‘the original chaos’, into the Imaginary; a 
move which corresponds to the ‘birth of the ego’ or self. Lacan had initially outlined this 
process in his (1936) paper on the ‘Mirror Stage’, where he first put forward the theory that 
identity resides in an image: to have a body you need an image of the body. In Seminar One 
Lacan develops these ideas, insisting also on the importance of the Symbolic in giving the 
subject his or her position in language. Without a system of symbols nothing in the Imaginary 
would have any meaning (ie one’s own mirror image would just be an un-nameable, 
meaningless ‘presence’). Drawing on Freud’s suggestion that we ‘picture the instrument that 
carries out our mental functions as resembling a compound microscope or a photographic 
apparatus’,
140
 Lacan demonstrates how the subject, at around 18 months of age, is able to 
produce an image of him or her self that gives him or her the illusion of physiological mastery. 
‘This is the original adventure through which man, for the first time, has the experience of 
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seeing himself, of reflecting on himself and of conceiving of himself as other than he is – an 
essential dimension of the human’.
141
 The ‘constitution of the world’ results, Lacan argues, 
from the relation of the Imaginary to the Real, but with everything depending on the position 
of the subject.  This position, he states, ‘is essentially characterised by [the subject’s] place in 
a Symbolic world, in other words in the world of speech’ The world is ‘set in motion… the 
imaginary and the real begin to be structured’ and the variety of human, nameable, objects 
are delineated at the moment when speech begins. Speech formulates a ‘fundamental 
structure’, which ‘humanises man… [T]he external world - what we call the real world, which 
is only humanised, symbolised world, the work of transcendence introduced by the symbol 
into the primitive reality - can only be constituted when a series of encounters have occurred 
in the right place’: when the subject has a place from which to speak.
142
 The example that 
Lacan uses in this seminar comes from one of Melanie Klein's case histories, that of a little 
boy, “Dick”, who 'has no system of substitution’. In other words, ‘he cannot say this is like that’ 
or that, or that… the boy, as Lacan argues, has ‘no substitutes, no equivalences'.
143
 In this 
way he is indifferent to everything that surrounds him (which he ignores), until he begins to 
conceptualise absence - to perceive the difference between, and therefore separation from, 
himself and the world. This anticipation of loss is marked, Lacan notes, by a cry - a ‘call’ 
which, Lacan suggests, comes from ‘beneath language.
144
’    
 
The photographic Punctum, like remembrance, appears to bypass speech, to leave us 
speechless. And yet Barthes, at some point, and when faced with a certain photograph, 
makes a cry. What is this cry?  If it is, as he asserts, the 'end of all language'
145
 is it, at the 
same time, the death of the subject? Some kind of self-resurrection?
146
 What Barthes had 
been looking for, while searching through the pile of photographs after the death of his mother 
is a photograph that would speak.
147
But the photograph that he finds, 'outside of 
"likeness"',
148
 'beyond simple resemblance',
149
 triggers in Barthes 'a sudden awakening... a 
Satori [a coming into ‘Being’: pure consciousness] in which words fail'
150
. And yet there is still 
the cry. What ‘discourse‘ is this? And what of the cry - as a beneath of language - made by 
the little boy in the case from Seminar One? Is it the same? The cry in the case cited by 
Lacan brought about the entry into language. With this condition of subjectivity came the 
beginning of an ego; the realisation, for the boy, of his own name. So it seems there are two 
forms of anxiety at play here, both triggered by an absence. The one that threatens the 
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subject, brings about a downfall (the Winter Garden photograph was, for Barthes, ‘like the last 
music Schumann wrote before collapsing’);
151
 and the other, that brings the subject into 
existence. (The boy, Dick, was alerted to the other, and therefore his ‘self’, by the sudden 
realisation that he is part of a system that loss is also a part of.) Is the ‘cry’, then, located at 
the knife’s edge between the two states, marking, perhaps, the point between life (love) or 
death (as an ecstatic kind of madness)? Occurring in a blinding ‘flash’, the cry marks a return 
of something, an absence for which there are no words. It can perhaps be equated with Jean-
Luc Nancy’s ‘call’ which, he claims, is both outside of memory and has ‘no addressee’. In this 
case, I believe, it is the cry itself that functions as mark (or hinge): the cry can be considered 
as the echo in the body of the loss that the subject undergoes when s/he enters language, or 
the ecstasy when s/he leaves it.
152
  The idea of a mark as pure unmediated presence; of 
something that functions as a hinge, threshold, or knife’s edge between presence and 
absence and that might take form simply as a ‘cry’ (a call that pierces the symbolic from the 
real), seems almost impossible to transform from theory into practice. How can an artist make 
a mark that is not a mark, that is instead a presence (as the return of an absence), of 
something that was never actually there? How to stage – as mark - this photographic 
remembrance that hovers, suspended - as a kind of speech defect - between language  and 
nothingness?
153
  
 
The Use Of Remembrance to Make a Work 
Tacita Dean’s tri-part film Boots (2003), records the performance of something akin to a 
memory theatre. The speaking character of the film’s name, ‘Boots’ takes a journey around 
an old house with which he appears to be familiar. Seemingly oblivious of the camera, he 
weaves about the building and spins a story about his relationship to the place, his memories 
of someone who used to live there: an ex lover, perhaps. Yet he doesn’t seem to stick to any 
particular script and instead departs, wonders, heads off, on his own. Stumbling along, Boots 
‘limps’, as Jean-Luc Nancy has commented, ‘through the cloisters, passages and temples of 
the vast memory without memories’.
154
 This is a mnemonics that, as memory ‘block’, stages a 
new set of possibilities for the (mute, silent or stuttering) expression of something that 
remains beyond or outside of any cultural mediation; something that, as a kind of trace, points 
to that which is unspeakable, unrepresentable, unobservable. ‘Boots’ throws off memory for 
involuntary recollection; for an encounter with the Real in the here and now - framed by the 
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Imaginary. He moves from place to place on three separate interlocking routes (each narrated 
in a different tongue; German, French or English) but where is he? What time? What place? 
Hinged on the words he uses, perhaps he is somewhere between certain – possibly true, 
possibly false - memories and the actual building itself, which guides him, and to which he 
spontaneously responds. However, he makes this movement, his performance, half blind. 
Why? Because he doesn’t know in advance either what he is going to say or where he is 
going. In this route he is guided by remembrance, not memory; remembrance is at play, not a 
mnemonics. This takes him through a set of spatial co-ordinates as yet unwritten and which, 
in the aftermath of the many separate journeys, accumulates as a spidery trace, a wake that 
is closer to a scribble or an illegible diagram that, left behind, indexes something.
155
 Recorded 
in the flickering, hallucinatory and ephemeral medium of film, which nevertheless has the 
deictic, indexical, attributes of the photograph, what is pieced together refuses memory or 
attachment to place and does so as a demand for life. The rooms, full of mirrors and 
windows, cannot frame nor contain the voice that echoes within them, which offers up 
something unrecitable, illegible; full of hesitations, reversals, garbled profanities and (quite 
possibly) lies; an evasive autobiography as ‘pointless stories,’
156
 which only form themselves 
within an artwork that brings all the threads together as (echoing Walter Benjamin’s 
commentary on Proust) a ‘Penelope work’ of remembrance. Boots is an anti-narrative of 
being, which becomes apparent to the viewer only somewhere between the viewing of the 
three separately housed films. In them Boots tells us pointless stories that stretch to infinity. 
 
The author Thomas Bernhard’s literary project also presents a kind of alternate or disturbing 
kind of mnemonics (i.e. his project explores a photographic rather than a culturally conformist 
memory). Bernhard’s texts take the form of what Barbara Theisen has identified as ‘self-
erasing’ narratives, established through his technique of quoting and re-quoting, listing and 
indexing, as well as in the way that he restates and contradicts his ideas, his thoughts and 
feelings, through repeating the same thing over and over again in different ways, or through 
‘speaking’ from many different viewpoints (all of which, however, might derive from the same 
character). The obdurate blocking of self narration, of self positioning, the refusal of anything 
like sublimation, of the absorption of being into history or culture is achieved, Theisen 
suggests, ‘through a technique of perspectivation and, one could almost say, of reproductive 
multiplication. [Bernhard] thus opens up [the mnemonic process] to a counter memory which 
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reconstructs, but only reconstructs observations of observations.’
157
 This is a technique used 
extensively in his novel Ausloschung (Extinction). Like the photograph, Bernhard’s text 
dismantles a coherent ‘inner’ self and at the same time pulls to pieces everything external to 
the self on which a self might be grounded. He ‘obliterates the realm of cultural memory’;
158
 
reduces it (as Dean’s character Boots does) to a scribble, to a meaningless catalogue. 
Through this textual unravelling that is also a tangling, a dense, impenetrable, unstoppable 
stream of exaggerations and understatement pores forth, unbroken by paragraphs or chapter 
headings. This is a form of story telling where what is remembered  – the point of the story - is 
clouded with doubt; it is this doubt that clogs up the works. Yet ironically what the story seeks, 
what it is aimed at, are the facts – that always lie out of reach. The narrator, who has just lost 
his parents and brother in a car accident, makes of the book a record of his life, yet this 
record, this documentary, never establishes anything as truth. We don’t know (because he 
doesn’t know) how he feels, who these people are, where he has come from.  This process of 
remembrance, as Theisen points out, ‘unfolds as a description of three photographs [which 
the narrator] had taken of his family, the only photographs he has kept and which he now, 
having just received the telegram [informing him of their deaths] takes from his desk’ The 
photographic image, Theisen suggests, is the ‘matrix from which the narrative process of 
Ausloschung infolds… Through a self-referential oscillation between positing and negating his 
considerations, the narrator uses photography to build up a representational paradox which 
he effaces in his very representation of.’
159
 But the narrative itself echoes the operation of the 
photograph; these photograph tell him nothing, they are accurate representations, but of 
what? In order to write about that which is impossible to retrieve, Bernhard bases his 
remembering on that which isn’t in the photographs (or anywhere else). He does this in order 
to (instead) erase his history – and to replace it with this new (barely readable) writing. 
Through this device, as Theisen suggests, Bernhard’s book Ausloschung also works against 
its own literary legacy: ‘Effacing itself in a mere title Ausloschung indexes its own form’; the 
book itself, through this methodology, traces the extinction of autobiographical writing - either 
as an art form or as any other credible practice. Through the sentence construction itself 
which, at the end of the very long book, never actually reflects or defines a single coherent 
subjective position, the writing ‘traces or marks its own erasure’
160
 as well as that of the 
subject of the narration. And as Theisen also suggests, this particular sentence construction, 
containing something – containing nothing – can be compared to the photographic detail 
which similarly represents something that isn’t there, that is unobservable, unrepresentable; 
thereby indicating the failure of both writing and photography to adequately describe or 
contain, to record or write, the truth of an experience or event. Even so, in trying to erase both 
his own ‘self’ and writing itself, the author makes something unique. A trace of something 
hangs in the air after the reader puts the book away, something that lingers, like an echo - or 
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smoke. This might be understood as the remains of an existence recorded, not by one who is 
remembering, but by one who tries to register that which occurs in the here and now - at the 
cost to selfhood. 
 
Apparently in contrast to Bernhard’s fictional character, Barthes, while researching his book 
on photography, tells of a sudden awakening. The imprint, mark or wound that he encounters 
in the photographic image is also that to which he is attracted. This attraction is 
adventitious
161
; it comes from without, seems accidental, yet it also has a compulsive aspect 
to it; it animates
162
 him, creating an ‘adventure’. Yet Barthes is fully aware that what this 
jolting to life actually connects with is a ‘stilled centre, an erotic or lacerating value buried in 
myself.’ He discovers ‘a sort of link (or knot) between Photography, madness, and something 
else whose name I did not know’
163
 but which is also a part of him; connected to his being. 
Recognising this signal - the automatic and insistent nature of this force or value - Barthes 
commits himself to a deeper investigation than the ‘hedonistic project’ his research into 
photography had so far been (regulated by the ‘imperfect mediator’ of that which simply 
‘pleasured’ him). To do this, however, as Barthes states, he must make a ‘recantation’: ‘my 
palinode’
164
.  A palinode is a piece of writing (usually a poem) that undoes any previous 
writing. He must, in other words, go back on himself, perform a kind of erasure, a rubbing out. 
Breaking with everything he has said before, Barthes proposes a dismantling in order to 
create a new form; something produced under the influence, the direction, of remembrance, 
of that beyond the pleasure principle. So Barthes’ text Camera Lucida becomes not so much 
a piece of writing about photography but a text that itself operates photographically, that 
traces something both irretrievable and unrepresentable and where remembrance, as 
Theisen argues in relation to Bernhard’s novelistic style, operates as a counter memory, as a 
kind of self effacement, or erasure. As an experiment in the “third form” – between essay and 
novel – the text of Camera Lucida, described by Graham Allen as 'impossible', is in fact 
simply ‘undevelopable’,
165
 like the haiku; in other words it is a text that structurally is closer to 
– as ecstatic equivalent of - the photograph. 
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                                                             '…to see a landscape as it is when I am not there…'
166
  
 
                                   '… how  describe the world seen without a self? There are no words.'
167
 
 
      Identity is itself a 'masquerade'; a failure to achieve a stable identity produces neurosis.
 168
  
 
                                                                            ‘And hysteria is what? Failed masquerade.'
169
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Smoke without Fire 
I would align my practice with the work of artists and writers who either utilise the 
photographic medium, or apply what Rosalind Krauss terms the 'conditions of photography'
170
 
to other media, and do so in order to explore or problematise the 'I'. In this way what might be 
described, or traced, is something like an estrangement from or within language, and where 
speech, particularly ones ‘own’, operates uneasily - in ‘quotation marks’. I am interested in the 
relationship between contemporary subjectivity and technology, and in artworks that, using a 
methodology that involves photography in some way or another, mark, draw out, or perform 
the action of the self. In what follows I will suggest that this element of photography – of 
something intrinsic to the photograph - introduces a component of emptiness.  
 
In the previous section I identified a kind of remembrance that, co-joined to forgetting, brings 
about a loss of selfhood: a blank that nevertheless is intrinsic to being
171
. I suggested that this 
operation of remembrance was connected in some way to that of the photograph, and that 
this had something to do with the peculiar ‘tense’ of remembrance. The sensation of 
something – as a "This", both 'evidential and exclamatory' - that was here and is back now, 
echoes the noeme of photography "That-has-been" (as defined by Roland Barthes in Camera 
Lucida), and evokes the retroactive temporality of the trauma, to which the photograph is also 
linked. I discussed how these thoughts were triggered by some photographs I had seen as a 
child that had shocked  - or marked – me, and how my current practice has, so to speak, 
evolved out of this initial encounter. I also raised the question as to why it is that the 
photographic medium is particularly suited for presenting as, paradoxically, a kind of indexical 
trace of it, the loss of selfhood that I had observed in these images; a spider's web as 
'automatic drawing'. Finally, I suggested that this 'photographic remembrance' or blank, as 
(by)product of the mechanism through which subjectivity is constituted and identity formed (a 
process that has some similarities with the way in which, via a lens, the photographic 
apparatus produces an image) can be used to generate a work, giving as examples (in 
addition to that of Proust's novel A la recherché du temps perdue) the work of Tacita Dean, 
Thomas Bernhard, and Barthes’ own text on photography. This section, in contrast, raises 
questions around a remembering, or a reminiscing, that stops forgetting. What might be 
remembered; 'stuck' or imprinted in the memory (rather than being connected to something 
'ecmnesic', outside of memory) is, however, equally unrepresentable. As I will argue, the 
difference between remembrance and reminiscing is the appearance of a sign - which could 
be a spoken narrative - as substitution for that which is unrepresentable.  
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Hysterics, according to Freud, 'suffer mainly from reminiscences'; the problem is that they 
can’t forget. Yet what the hysteric remembers is avoided at all costs. The hysteric will go out 
of his or her way to avoid having anything to do with what it is that he or she cannot forget, 
which is 'usually concerned with a wish or a psychosexual desire about which [they] do not 
want to know and against which they vigorously defend themselves with symptoms'.
172
 These 
diversionary tactics, as a glossing over of the true state of affairs, and which Freud had first 
noticed in the phenomenon of 'negative hallucination’ are in fact, as Darian Leader points out, 
'the basic characteristic of the ego at all times. As with the ego of the mirror phase, [the task 
of this ego] is to maintain a false appearance of coherence and completeness'.
173
 This may 
frequently involve taking a particular route to blank out what you know but don’t want to face. 
Hysterics, in particular, are very preoccupied by what they don't want to know, yet suffer from 
a kind of nagging doubt about it, where the thing that is being glossed over  (perhaps 
because it doesn’t fit in with their own idea of themselves) keeps coming to the surface, 
demanding representation. Ulrich Baer
174
 defines hysteria as being produced by 'the double 
bind of a cultural imperative to have no memory of one's physical experiences [or, I would 
add, physical desire] and, at the same time to be defined by a body that betrays such a 
memory', a body that is imprinted by memory. However, as I will argue below, what the 
hysteric remembers is an outcome of desire, so that memory, in this case, might be equated 
with desire.  Hysterics avoid what they want, while continuously returning to it. Always on their 
minds, the repressed thought looks for different ways of representing itself.  
 
Hysteria indexes something that escapes categorisation or naming, and that rests at the 
borderline between language and that of which it is impossible to speak. Awakened by the 
operation of language's symbolic cut, hysteria is a desire 'to retrieve what is lost and to 
annihilate the lack';
175
 it is something that is trying to get (back) into language that which can 
never 'be' there, because it is connected to, as reminder of, the object extracted from the 
subject by the process of symbolisation - language - in the first place. This fixation with the 
impossible was, as Michael Finn argues, key to the Proustian narrative, where a certain kind 
of ‘wordless, bodily copying of gesture and event is revealed to be at the heart of [Proust’s] 
writing technique.’ Finn labels Proust a language hysteric
176
 and argues that both the 
Proustian narrative and its style is ‘conditioned by hysteria’. Also writing on Proust, Benjamin 
notes that Proust’s ‘work of spontaneous recollection … [weaves] the tapestry of lived life as 
loomed for us by forgetting.’
177
 This forgetting - this remembrance - is related to the body. As 
Benjamin adds, ‘Proust’s syntax rhythmically and step by step reproduces his fear of 
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suffocating.’
178
 We see this ‘writing of the body’ at work in another kind of autobiography; 
Barthes’ own Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, a text punctuated with photographs, 
scribbles or ‘doodling’ (‘the signifier without the signified’)
179
, that ‘can recount nothing’ but 
which takes his body ‘elsewhere, far from my imaginary person [the self, the ego] towards a 
kind of memoryless speech.’
180
 Writing with his desire’,
181
 equated with and drawn from the 
body, Barthes attempts to represent something that cannot be represented; ‘neither the skin, 
nor the muscles, nor the bones, nor the nerves, but the rest: an awkward, fibrous, shaggy, 
ravelled thing, a clown’s coat’;
182
 Barthes suggests the blood in this passage which, put 
differently, points to the heart: desire. The ‘discourse of the hysteric’, as Parveen Adams has 
suggested, boils down to the endlessly repeated question “Who am I?”; translatable as “What 
is my desire?”. This question is asked ‘a thousand exasperating ways’, Adams observes, and 
most typically ‘to the medical man.’
183
 In other words, it is concerned with the body. Yet this 
question is also in fact aimed at that which resists interpretation; at that which doesn’t get 
symbolised; the gap which coincides with that in the signifying chain, which triggers desire. 
This gap in knowledge is filled only with the bodies’ undecipherable, unsymbolisable, signs or 
traces; the ‘cause’ of all these endlessly repeated and unanswerable questions. 
 
Around 1887, Freud was beginning to realize that there was something that the hysteric was 
unwilling to speak about. And yet, as Lacan points out, Freud formulated his theory through 
listening to speech. 'Through this door', Lacan writes, 'Freud entered what was, in reality, the 
relations of desire to language', where language is placed 'in opposition' to desire, desire 
remaining outside of, inassimilable to, language.
184
 Symptoms are made up of words and, 
mirroring the way that language produces meaning, they take the form of a contiguous series 
of displacements, which might be thought of as that which is frozen out of speech. Freud 
realised, as Jacqueline Rose suggests, that 'the unconscious is the only defence against a 
language frozen into pure, fixed, or institutionalised meaning, [and that] what we call 
sexuality, in its capacity to unsettle the subject is a break against the intolerable limits of 
common sense… That there is another scene to the language through which we most 
normatively identify and recognise our self is the basic tenet of Freudian psychoanalysis.'
185
 
This discovery, states Lacan, was the true point of departure for psychoanalysis. Stumbling 
'upon the impossible desire of the hysteric', Freud discovered that 'the object which causes 
this desire' - that which is given up by the subject as the price of his entry into language – 'is 
an object that is lost forever… From that point on, hysteria was no longer determined by 
some mysterious trauma, but by an inarticulable desire that, like meaning itself, kept on being 
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displaced.'
186
  In a letter to colleague Wilheim Fleiss Freud made a point fundamental to his 
studies: "longing is the main character-trait of hysteria"'.
187
  
 
As Juliet Mitchell suggests, the condition of hysteria still exists, although in different forms, 
today. Supremely mimetic, hysteria migrates into whatever culturally available mode of 
expression suits or is available for its purpose: that of refusing or protesting against the very 
culture it has sprung from.
188
 This means that it can't be defined solely by a list of symptoms, 
which are anyway ever mutating and socio-culturally specific. Instead, the definition of the 
psychoanalytic category of Hysteria, evolving out of the writings of Freud and developed by 
Lacan, should be understood structurally; it is a psychic position, perhaps understood as the 
way in which the "I" writes itself, and is one of a number of ways in which a subject locates 
him or her self in relation to the lost object, or hole, knocked out of the Real upon his or her 
entry into language. There is no 'normal condition' in relation to this lack; every subject relates 
in different ways to the fundamental separation opened up by our entry into the symbolic. 
Language produces desire; the subject of language is a subject who lacks. However, as 
Dylan Evans states, '[T]he structure of desire, as desire for the other [is] shown more clearly 
in hysteria than in any other clinical structure; the hysteric is precisely someone who 
appropriates another's desire by identifying with them.' Hysteria, in other words, epitomises 
desire; hysteria is desire taken to extremes. 
 
Much of what follows hinges on Barthes’ statement regarding photography's 'disturbance (to 
civilisation)'. Through the photograph, as he argues, you are presented with the opportunity 
'to see oneself (differently than in a mirror)'
189
 The disturbance (linked to that of the hysteric, 
perhaps?)
190
 is to the social order. What photography presents us with contains an element of 
something unregulated; what 'occurs' in it operates outside the taming effect of culture. As 
outlined in the previous section, seeing oneself as other is, in Lacanian terms, the necessary 
action that constitutes the ego, but it is the difference between Lacan's illusory self, mediated 
by the Other, and the self that is other to the one located in a mirror that presents a problem, 
as disturbance to selfhood, which photography reminds us of; confronting us perhaps, with a 
potential problem in the identificatory process, a fault in the construction of the self. 
Photography reveals what the ego strives to conceal; that the 'self' is embodied in an 
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alienating image – the self is both illusory, false, and outside the subject – and that, in 
addition, it contains an inaccessible, 'uncivilised' component. In this way, Walter Benjamin's 
claim that technological advances in photography would mean that appearances would soon 
be recorded 'as faithfully as any mirror'
191
 would of course be refuted by Barthes – it is 
precisely in the difference between the mirror image and the photographic image that the 
disturbance resides. However, and preceding Barthes, Benjamin does suggest that the 
photographic instrument was, unintentionally, the origin of a 'succession of subsequent 
discoveries'  – one of which, perhaps uncovered by Charcot through his practice of 
photographing the inmates of the Salpétrière asylum at the end of the 19th century, was that 
there exists in the subject, as in the photographic image, a piece that is incomprehensible, 
non-communicable, and out of sight
192
.  
 
This discovery is why, as Didi-Huberman claims, it is possible to suggest that Charcot 
'invented' hysteria,
193
 or at least the version of it that has passed down to us through his 
photographic archive, the "Iconography" (praised by Breton as the "greatest poetic discovery 
of the late nineteenth century"). The camera was the ideal apparatus for reproducing the 
unrepresentable. Although the phenomenon of hysteria may have been uncovered by 
Charcot, however, the question as to what was actually seen by him is disputable. As Ulrich 
Baer observes,
194
 Charcot's photographs 'depict mental disturbances.'
195
 Yet it is not simply 
their photographic reproduction that 'allows these pictures to be regarded as illustrations of 
the "disturbance to civilisation" that Barthes had noted. 'Instead of constituting purely visual 
evidence,' claims Baer, a few of the photographs make readable… the structural similarities 
between hysteria and photography.'
196
 This is in regard to the status of the referent. Baer 
argues that Charcot's photographs become readable 'by putting into question the status of the 
referent as purely visual.' Similarly, the questions Benjamin puts to photography revolve 
around the 'something new and strange' with which photography has imprinted the image, a 
something that 'remains', lingering outside or beyond issues of technical achievement or 
aesthetic value. Interestingly, Benjamin describes the 'senseless', incommunicable thing that 
he is made aware of in the photograph - that is present in the image  - as being like 'smoke 
without fire'
197
. The importance of this description to me is connected to the fact that smoke is 
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one of the categories of signs that, since C.S. Pierce,
198
 is termed indexical. Rosalind Krauss 
notes that  ‘As distinct from symbols, indexes establish their meaning along the axis of a 
physical relation to their referents.  They are the marks or traces of a particular cause and 
that cause is the thing to which they refer' Krauss gives ‘footprints’ as a familiar example of an 
indexical sign… and also, ‘medical symptoms’.
199
 However, as Benjamin points out, the 
particular sign that he is confronted with in the photograph has no cause. The thing to which it 
'refers' does not exist. This links hysteria to photography. Perhaps it is not accidental that, as 
Baer notes, photography was used 'to diagnose the disease that defied anatomy'. I mean this 
with reference to the 'hysterical' claim that something is there in the body that cannot be 
traced to any particular physical part. Photography also contains this missing bit. As presence 
of an absence, Baer suggests, 'both hysteria and photography develop out of events that 
recur as absent originals'
200
 
 
There is a 'privileged relation between the structure of desire and the structure of hysteria',
201
 
which, as Baer argues, echoes that of photography.
202
 The meeting place between the three 
might have occurred in Charcot's photography studio, with the medical man exploiting what 
was then still an emergent technology. And in fact, perhaps Freud kept Charcot in mind when, 
in developing his theory of the unconscious,
203
 he suggested that 'we picture the mind as a 
photographic plate (or apparatus)'.
204
 I mentioned this analogy in section one as the basis for 
Lacan's model through which he illustrates subjective experience - as dependent on the 
relation between the Symbolic, Imaginary and Real - but it is important to note that in this 
context Lacan sticks to pure optics, thus grounding his discussion in an analogy of how the 
world, as an imaginary, symbolic world, is created and perceived in the here and now. In the 
context of a discussion of the unconscious however, Freud's analogy presupposes that the 
images in the mind – like the photographic print - have a retroactive temporality. As Baer 
points out, '… [through Freud] the dissociation of self and body which Charcot thought to have 
encountered in hysteria came to be understood in temporal terms. It is Freud and Breuer's 
emphasis on temporal dissociation that renders their insights particularly useful for an 
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understanding between hysteria and photography.'
205
 Baer notes Freud's observation that the 
strongest compulsive influence arises from impressions made at a time 'when [the child's] 
psychical apparatus…[is] not yet completely receptive.' In other words when they do not know 
what they are looking at, when for various reasons they do not 'see'. Baer suggests that these 
are experiences that would have passed through those who experienced them  (the subjects 
who were there 'at the time') 'as something Real that does not coalesce into memories; as an 
'inexperienced experience'
206
 (which would, nevertheless, have marked them). Similarly, the 
photograph can exclude both the viewer as well as the original photographer and the subjects 
in the photograph – none of whom can see what is/was happening at the moment the shutter 
is pressed. As Jakki Spicer observes, '[T]he photo testifies to the theft of experience, to the 
non seeing that structures [both] trauma [and hysteria]'.
207
 In this way hysteria can be 
considered as 'both blindness and out of time-ness. It is a retroactive knowledge that knows 
neither what nor when.' Like the photograph, Baer writes, trauma and hysteria 'index a crisis 
of representation.'
208
  
 
Baer's argument, which centres on the case of the Holocaust
209
, examines the problem of 
how events that have actually happened
210
 to individuals, can nevertheless remain impossible 
to represent or, even at the time, be experienced. This is where, drawing on Barthes, he 
makes the link between the structure of the trauma and the operation of photography; 
'Because trauma blocks routine mental processes from converting an experience into 
memory', Baer writes, the trauma 'parallels the defining structure of photography, which also 
traps an event during its occurrence while blocking its transformation into memory.'
211
 Baer is 
using the analogy with the photographic process in order to construct a theory of trauma 
within which a real or actual event is embedded – his concern lies within the problem of 
experiencing actual events, whereas I am more interested in thinking (and working) in relation 
to a theory of desire (and its extreme form hysteria); this as a psychic structure within which 
the subject circles around a non-existent, always already lost, object. Now, as Freud asserts, 
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the core of a hysterical attack is a memory.
212
  However, although Freud started off by 
believing that the women who came to him had suffered some sort of (usually sexual) abuse, 
he came to realise that their symptoms, like mimed gestures, were pointing to something 
more probably related to a fantasy, itself a product, as compromise, of the way that language 
shuts desire out. So it is desire - the fantasy - that, in Baer's phrase,  'usurps the place of 
memory, invading the body with a symptom that is neither integrated into consciousness nor 
describable as an "experience"'. What is 'remembered' in hysteria, indexes desire; in this way 
desire can be equated with Benjamin's 'smoke without fire'.  
 
Hysteria then, is a strange kind of sign – a referent-less index – marking the place where the 
'spark' of something inassimilable to language has, as Benjamin puts it, 'seared the 
subject';
213
 where this 'spark' might be equated with an idea (a fantasy) that cannot be put into 
words. Hysteria indexes something that escapes categorisation or naming and that rests at 
the borderline between language and that of which it is impossible to speak. This desire, 
awakened by the operation of language's symbolic cut; is a desire 'to retrieve what is lost and 
to annihilate the lack', 
214
it is a something that is trying to get (back) into language that can 
never 'be' there, where this something is connected to, as reminder of, the lost object, rather 
than a particular event. In relation to hysteria, Didi-Huberman notes this 'strange operation of 
memory' 
215
 Memory is at fault in hysteria, although in fact there is no memory, other than that 
of an indefinable 'before'. Hysterics are preoccupied by being trapped in language. The frozen 
poses ‘struck’ by the hysterics could be thought of as a kind of inhabiting of - or of being 
trapped within - a fixed or ready made phrase. As a response that echoes in the body – 
where an echo can be considered as another example of an indexical sign without a 
referent
216
 - desire is 'a restless objectless yearning, a relentless striving to obtain nothing.'
217
 
The photograph refers to a moment that never entered consciousness. As Barthes suggests, 
it 'mechanically repeats what could never be repeated existentially'
218
 echoing, in this way, 
desire, which can also never enter language - as well as echoing the cause of desire. 
 
The invention of the photograph introduced civilisation to an object within which time had 
been fixed; apparent in what Jeff Wall has described as 'the blurred elements of Daguerre’s 
first street scenes. And yet, for me, the interest in Daguerre’s picture is not in the blur – there 
is no blur. The photograph has been marked, instead, with the imprint of stillness. Everything 
in the street vanishes, but for one figure with which the image has (so to speak) been 
branded. This figure, a silhouette, is a testimony of presence but, because of the literal 
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incorporation - absorption even – of it by time, so that the image becomes a kind of notation, 
or score, of a particular duration, it is also simultaneously a testimony of absence. A cut out. 
Time has burnt into the image, which records the subsequent evaporation of the subject.
219
 
This photograph records the disappearance of the individual into generic ‘type’; into the 
‘other’, and reveals a Paris that no one, including Daguerre, had ever seen prior to that 
photograph’s existence. From its origins, suggests Wall, photography ‘pushes towards a 
discovery of qualities apparently intrinsic to the medium’. Even at a stage when photography 
had barely made its mark, what emerges, like a shadow, is an unpredictable, ‘invisible’ trace, 
which is also a kind of erasure of the subject. This 'freezing out', as mortification of the 
subject, the photographic 'stop' to exchange and mobility, mirrors the subject's trapping in 
language, copied in the frozen poses of the Salpétrière women. Hysteria is another kind of 
'stilling', a 'stilled voice', where the subject is lost for words. And rather than words 'failing' as 
they did for Barthes, for the hysteric 'there are no words'. Here it may be possible to make a 
comparison between the ideas around the 'representation of the un-representable' as 
discussed in the previous section, and the hysteric’s meaningless signs.  In this case what is 
inassimilable is desire itself, the 'kernel of nonsense', at the heart of the subject. Hysteria is 
not unrepresentable – it just doesn't have any end point. Words are not enough - the hysteric 
wants to go beyond. Hysteria is a never ending attempt to inscribe that which is invisible, 
unrepresentable; that which constantly escapes, evades definition, categorisation, naming 
(and therefore 'cure' – an end point). Hysteria cannot be  'disappeared', it cannot be erased, 
as it is only ever traced through its facsimile or copy (that which it duplicates); through the 
mark it makes as mirror, index, echo, cast of itself. The desire of the hysteric endlessly slides 
into whatever is 'other', outside, unregulated, uncontrolled. Hysteria 'itself' is not there; it 'does 
not exist.' 
 
Mimesis is the hysterical symptom par excellence. In his essay on photography, Walter 
Benjamin hints at an identification between the subject of the photograph and the early 
photographic apparatus, with the subject's 'rigidity' betraying 'the impotence of that 
generation in the face of technical [cultural/social] progress'
220
 Similarly, the nineteenth 
century's portrayal or performance of hysteria could be considered as 'an imitation of the 
[then concurrent modes of the] photographic process'.
221
 As Didi-Huberman argues, at 
the Salpetriere, in the concomitant development of photography, 'hysteria constructed an 
image of and for itself'. Photography was an appropriate medium, or conduit, for the 
hysterics as well as for the medical profession, although ultimately it failed to satisfy 
either; neither the medical profession’s impulse to categorise, name and thereby limit this 
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disorder nor the women their who had something to say that - as a gesture indexing the 
desire of the body - had to remain untranslatable; an enigma. Yet it is possible to suggest 
that, at the Salpetriere, hysteria made a temporary pact with photography, assisted or 
enabled by Charcot. This might explain why the "hystero-epilepsy" he had made famous 
‘existed only at the Salpetriere'
222
  - home of his new photographic studio. Photography 
mirrored the hysterics’ own condition, which they returned as echo, through their staged, 
photographic, performances, their frozen poses the physical manifestation or indexical 
traces of a state of mind, of something inexpressible or outside of language. This 
photographic mimicry went both ways, with the hysterics striking poses selected from, 
co-ordinated to and corresponding with, the photographic catalogue they themselves had 
'written'. As Ulrich Baer writes, 'the hysterical body was from the beginning a site of 
reproduction, and by shifting the origin of hysteria from body to brain (the psyche), 
Charcot understood the body as an independent agent, indeed a “medium” yielding 
signs… Insofar as the hysterical body is the site of this "hallucinatory reliving", which 
occurs without conscious control, it was possible for Charcot to think of his patient as an 
"homme-machine"… a mechanical contraption void of any cognitive dimension.’
223
  
 
Hysteria is a relation to the other's desire. The hysteric copies (the other) exactly, 
photographically; the result, as in the photograph, is that the "I" is absent. The hysterical 
body, as duplicating machine, leaves the self out. The photograph cannot speak of what 
it has copied, and it is this condition to which the hysteric responds. Everything is there in 
the image she creates, except her self, who is 'on hold'. Like a camera, the hysterical 
body reproduces signs that are unrepresentable; like Barthes’ photographic 
‘hallucination’ they are are both absent and ‘has been’; the site of ruin. Hysteria 
recognised and, at the Salpetriere, utilised and exhibited the disturbance to the look that, 
as Barthes suggested the 'new action of photography' brought to civilisation.
224
 The 
frozen poses of the hysterics were compatible with those of the photographic print, which 
pointed to something outside of culture – what Barthes objects to as civilising and 
therefore ‘taming’
225
 - to something limitless, closer to desire itself. Prior to photography 
there were drawings, depictions, illustrations etc. of woman, but these were never 
'collusions', collaborative efforts, on which the condition of being a woman was imprinted. 
The Salpetriere women, arguably, had conscious understanding of the photographic; 
they could have performed anywhere. Charcot, as Didi-Huberman might suggest, just 
pressed a particular button.
226
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The Reproduction of an Unrepresentable Sign 
John Ireland
227
 makes a connection between Maupassant's short story "Le Signe” and 
the basis upon which Freud develops his theory of hysteria and in doing so suggests an 
alternative influence on Freud to the problems of his supposed ‘scopophilia’ that 
dominate Didi-Huberman's argument. Ireland’s essay focuses instead on the mode of 
communication, the form that this 19th century version of hysteria adopted; which is 
connected to the photographic operation of the index. Hysteria, like photography, is a 
sign that is a copy, a sign that has a direct relation to its cause, even although as argued 
above, the hysterical sign has no tangible cause, or referent. Hysteria as a structure, 
then, is imprinted on the Salpetriere images, not hysteria as a certain set of gestures or a 
particular pose (these secondary attributes, as suggested above, being derived from the 
fin de siecle cultural model of ‘woman’). Hysteria mirrors its environment; it is a case 
where the normal psychic processes of identification have strayed too far outside their 
boundaries. In this way hysteria is also the 'advent of the self as other' in the particular 
way that photography is. Now, in Maupassant's story "Le Signe", the Baronne de 
Grangerie, who is not only from the highest strata of society but is also a respectable – 
i.e. married - woman, sits at her window watching a prostitute, 'a vilaine fille', who sitting 
in her window is, in more ways than one, on the opposite side of the street. This woman, 
as Ireland tells the story, is at this very moment engaged in the process of plying her 
trade. The Baronne is 'fascinated by the ease with which [the prostitute] makes contact 
with prospective clients in the street below. Yet there seems to be no overt 
communication. Picking up her opera glasses for closer scrutiny, the Baronne is able to 
discern the little movement of the head with which the prostitute makes her offer… 
Leaving her window seat, the Baronne moves to a mirror to see if she can reproduce the 
sign. When she discovers, with some excitement, that she can, the temptation to try it 
once on her own account proves overwhelming…'
228
 This 'reproduction' of a sign, as 
described in Maupassant's story, 'so slight, so discreet', was used by Freud, as Ireland 
suggests, as 'evidence to support a reading of a neurosis he was struggling to 
elucidate',
229
 a neurosis that seemed to be characterised by 'the uncontrollable impulse 
to imitate',
230
 through a sign, a fixed gesture or 'still' - such as that of the prostitute that 
the Baronne copies. It was this realisation that led Freud to separate physical symptoms 
from physical causes; the problems of the hysteric - acted out in the body – come from 
‘elsewhere’. And it is significant to this discussion that the Baronne imitates the other 
while in front of a mirror, which, instead of re-affirming her self image, her imaginary 
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‘whole’, in this case operates like a photograph; the Baronne comes to occupy (the 
desired position of) the other.  
 
Hysteria combines the photograph's indexically-based power of certification with its 
illegibility; the origin of hysteria is invisible, unrecordable, unrecoverable, represented by 
an untranslatable sign, a mark or trace of the something within the subject that is outside 
the boundaries of a self; that is absent or ‘ruined’.
231
 To summarise the above, hysteria 
can be defined as a particular mode of recording or rejecting the experience of 'being' in 
language. Like the photograph, hysteria has a specific temporal structure; that of the 
'after effect'. Memory is involved, but what is remembered, as a kind of nostalgic 
'reminiscence', is something that was never possible in language, instead, as 'strange 
operation of memory', hysteria indexes desire; like smoke without fire, it has no 
detectable physical cause.   As 'disturbance to civilisation', to identity and selfhood, 
hysteria is unspeakable. In short, what Freud may have discovered is that Hysteria 
operates, like photography, as the reproduction – or index - of an un-representable sign. 
This links the ‘index’ to the ‘blind spot’ outlined in the first section. 
 
In what follows I will be exploring the ways in which the relation of the subject to 
photography can take this  'hysterical' form, as manifested in certain types of artwork and 
writing. Articulated as a crisis of representation, which by extension is reflected in ways 
in which the self is constructed, Hysteria can be considered as a world without a self. I 
will also be looking at ways in which the fantasy can be represented - as embedded in an 
artwork – and will do this by drawing on Rosalind Krauss's essay Notes on the Index. 
Any unit of language and of course individual words themselves, as Bruce Fink points 
out, can only ever be 'representations of representations'; artists work with this 
knowledge, they work on it. Artworks perhaps come out of attempts to trace this 
unrepresentable hole or empty centre, the unthinkable, unnameable, unspeakable. In his 
book The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance Fink discusses this 
condition of language, which we all share. Through Lacan, he argues that the referent is 
always absent or missing, un-presented. It can be, however, pointed to – indexed – by 
the representative of that referent. Lack is represented but never presented. Void of 
meaning – but not without it - artworks of interest to this thesis are occupied with ‘the 
empty thing around which meaning circulates.’ 
 
One such example comes from the photographic work of artist Anna Mossman. It is the index 
that is important in Mossman's work because with it she traces an "I" in which the fantasy  - of 
what an "I" might be – remains. As the artist, the maker of these marks, Mossman no doubt 
identifies with and is identified by the set of otherwise meaningless marks on the graph paper, 
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yet the presence of the index allows her to ‘say no more’ than that. The piece contains a set 
of (non) decisions but does not explain them. Furthermore, by refusing to follow normal 
photographic procedure and print the photograph - which begins as a negative - onto positive 
paper, Mossman prints it as it is, in negative. In other words she refuses to re-instate the 
missing object that is there in all photography, she refuses to cover up its ‘absence’. This is 
interesting because, while being more ‘true’ to photography, the resulting image – as ghost of 
the missing object - looks less like a conventional photograph. It also reminds you that the 
real thing (the original object) is missing. Mossman’s photographic works do not let you forget 
what is the case for all photographs: that what you are looking at is not the thing itself, yet 
once you have been reminded of its absence by the presence of its negative, you want to 
know what is missing, you want to fill the thing in, and do so by asking yourself what the 
‘opposite’ of the thing in front of you might be. However, because of the nature of language – 
as a set of endlessly substitutable symbols - there is no one possible answer. All you have is 
the endlessly repeatable question: what was – or is -  there?  
Mossman photographs her own drawings that, completed according to a set of rules or simple 
criteria, often take a considerable length of time to finish. In this way she makes integral to the 
work something that doesn’t necessarily need to be there; ie why not show the drawings 
themselves (they are certainly beautiful and accomplished enough)? Yet in Mossman’s work, 
photography insists upon itself. It points out how she has inscribed something contingent, 
subjective and therefore unrepresentable into the image and reinforced this inscription 
through the operation of the index. Without the photograph this point would be lost. Through 
the addition of the index, the ‘inhuman’ mark in photography, a kind of erasure occurs; a blind 
field is created.  Mossman offers to the visual field that which is unsee-able. Yet the index is 
already there in the drawing, which traces the response of her body to the rules she has 
proscribed for the work. In this way Mossman traces something that doubly evades 
symbolisation. Furthermore, the time spent on the drawing (which can be up to 18 months) 
and the events that directed - or ‘coloured’ - the mark-making processes, are swallowed up in 
the instant of the photograph, in the photographic event, which obliterates them but only to 
put something closer to those original events in their place. By being the index of an index 
(like the photo of the spider webs) Mossman’s work pulls the mark or trace (as signifier) back 
towards the abyss, back towards nothingness, meaninglessness; the presence of the 
unrepresentable. This strategy indicates, despite the rules used to generate the work, that 
what the resulting images veer towards is return to dis-order or chaos, to an event that either 
preceeds or exceeds that which structures language, that which instigates the symbolic order. 
The process of photographing the drawings takes the mark back to that which is inhuman, 
closer to the illegibility and incomprehensibility of the stain. Yet the works also perform 
something analogous to memory's 'evasive path', which might get interrupted at various 
points by 'remembrance'; in other words that which, according to Barthes,  'blocks' memory, 
forcing it to reroute, take another path.  
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My interest in Anna Mossman’s work is obvious; it is because what it reaches for has 
resonance with that which I am aiming at in my own practice. In contrast to Mossman’s work, 
which I would align with the photographic operation of desire, the artist Thomas Demand’s 
photographs are, as Parveen Adams has suggested, ‘in a world of their own.’
232
 This is to 
suggest that what might be being staged is – as close as might be possible – the index alone, 
without any supplementary discourse or punctuation. ‘Objects’, as Adams has written in 
relation to Demand’s work, ‘are usually shot through with fantasy, in that they hold out some 
promise of desire fulfilled.  Such are the objects that we recognise.  Such are the objects [that 
we either] desire to have or avoid…Demand’s objects are not like this.  He presents the 
object as it is, or at least as near to itself as it is possible to be. In Demand an object is just an 
object.  It does not promise anything and it does not hide anything.  Neither is it a substitute 
for another object. The paper [in the works] is ‘blank’ and allows, as Demand himself points 
out, for the complete isomorphism of the signifier and the signified.  For a sheet of paper is 
indeed where signifier and signified meet.  It is a sheet of paper and it is made of paper. 
Demand’s object…does not stand in for something else.  This object stands and it isn’t the 
referent of representation.’ 
233
 So what is it then? 
 
A World without a Self 
The earliest recorded photograph is documented as 1832
234
 – although both this date 
and the object of the claim is open to some debate. However, by the time Freud had 
arrived at the Salpetriere in 1886, to see for himself Charcot's ‘performers’, photography 
had been on the scene for quite a while. By this time, also, Gustave Flaubert had written 
Madame Bovary (the novel was published in the Revue de Paris in 1856), drawing, for 
his definition of hysteria, on the lengthy entry in the Dictionnaire des Sciences Medicales, 
(1812-22):  'dizzy spells, nervous attacks, anxiety, feelings of suffocation, irritability, 
melancholia, boredom, torpor, feverish volubility, palpitations, vacancy, fog in the 
head…'
235
 Hysteria, it was felt, had its laws
236
. Emma Bovary was loyal to the script. 
However, it is the way these performances are narrated by Flaubert as flat and empty 
description, precisely modelled and with complete objectivity that hysteria is actually 
inscribed, rather than in Emma’s theatrics. In other words the text itself can be regarded 
as a mirror of them. Flaubert writes hysterically. He writes, as Stephen Heath states in 
his commentary on Madame Bovary, with ‘unnerving flatness’, suggesting that what 
Flaubert was aiming at with his novel was an equivalence with the photographic 
apparatus. The writing is objective, repetitive. Madame Bovary is a book that, in 
Flaubert's own words, had to be 'about nothing'. It was to be a book that would articulate 
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nothingness, that would pivot on nothing - the empty space or void at the heart of 
meaning, from which desire spins its web.
237
  Aimed at the emptiness of the society that 
it was written within, it also mirrored this society ‘through its language, its clichés.'
238
 
Flaubert adopted ‘a strategy of imitation involving an assembly of stereotypes, a 
dictionary of received ideas: “there would not be a single word of mine in the whole 
book”, he boasted, promising to create a mode of writing, “that will be totally elusive, un-
decidable, leaving no firm hold for the reader…[a writing] constrained to the monochrome 
flatness of the social world, observed and recorded like a photograph”.’
239
 With Flaubert 
you have something of the truth of language, and the relation of the unconscious to it. In 
a letter to a friend Flaubert declared that he was writing  ‘…a book dependent on nothing 
external, which would hold up on its own by the internal strength of its style…a book 
which would have almost no subject, or at least in which the subject would be almost 
invisible.‘ 
240
 
 
Flaubert’s contemporary, the novelist Edmund Duranty, while declaring a commitment in 
his writing to 'an exact, complete and sincere reproduction of the social milieu, and the 
epoch in which one lives'
241
 criticised Madame Bovary as the work of ‘an arithmetician’. 
'Everything is held at the same level, with people equalised in their relentless 
ordinariness and their similar treatment …[described] without love, without any 
preference, solely because the material objects are there, because the photographic 
apparatus has been set up and everything must be reproduced.'
242
 Yet: ‘…I wanted…to 
reproduce types’ declared Flaubert
243
, as Charcot might have done. Indeed, Madame 
Bovary was written with such exactitude  - such scientific precision – that it might be 
mistaken for a case history. Madame Bovary is a study of desire in language, complete 
with a reference book – a ‘dictionary of received ideas’ – that is actually embedded within 
its narrative, arguably a series of monologues, in which the empty, stock expressions are 
marked as components of a restrictive and suffocating identity. Freud had realised, 
having abandoned the work he had started in response to Charcot, that it wasn’t the 
womb but language itself that was imprisoning his hysterics; it was, as outlined above, 
language that they were both entombed within and estranged from.  But how then were 
these hysterics, mainly women, to speak? Flaubert wrote about this imprisonment by 
using nothing other than the ready-made expressions and phrases through which these 
lives were lived. Within this rigidity of performance it is possible to mark the place of a 
refusal. Hysteria is an encounter with the fault, that place wherein a fundamental 
incompatibility lies, yet this point of refusal is simultaneously an event – a mark. 'Before 
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Charcot,’ as Stephen Heath suggests, ‘before Freud, at the beginning of all the medical-
psychological work around "the woman question", Flaubert …moves hysteria from 
sickness and pathology to critique and writing.'
244
 Some forty years after Madame 
Bovary, having turned decisively away from Charcot's choreographical methodologies, 
Freud wrote his Studies on Hysteria. When he had finished the book he apparently 
expressed surprise that the case histories contained therein read like novels.
245
 
 
Flaubert’s writing technique consisted of collage-ing together, as if in a list, a series of 
linguistic repetitions; phrases that he had noticed people using and being limited by, 
stock phrases that shut out the individual out of the creative side of language, from 
saying anything other than that which was standardised by the social norms. Yet 
Flaubert is caught too in this on dit, held, like everyone else, to the given language and 
all its compulsions of meaning.  The whole book should be in italics, suggests Heath, 
‘which is the very project of the Dictionnaire des idées recues, but also of Madame 
Bovary in its impersonality of free indirect style, with Flaubert not owning any of the 
words and phrases he thereby quotes, puts into silent italics…' As Heath suggests, the 
writer in free indirect style moves into discourses without assuming any one as his… but 
without the assumption either, of some narrative metalanguage.
246
 In this way Flaubert 
creates an identity for himself as copy – he is not different from the world in which he 
lives, which creates – writes - him rather than the other way round. Interestingly, Michel 
Foucault comments on two of Flaubert’s other characters, the ‘kindred sprits’ Bouvard 
and Pecuchet, who occupy themselves 'by copying books, copying their own books, 
copying every book… and who do so because ‘to copy is to do nothing; it is to be the 
books being copied'
247
.  
 
Like the hysteric, Flaubert points out – by copying it – that which is disturbing in 
civilisation, that which denies us our individuality and forces us to conform to the 
standardised 'other'. He does this by adopting the point of view of the photographer. 
Using a photographic mode of address, Flaubert constructs his sentences, so to speak, 
as if he were a camera. It is, as Heath suggests, Flaubert’s own strategy of copying that 
'provides an answer to the question of how one is to write without oneself being caught in 
the given discourses, gripped by the existing stereotypes, held to this or that position.’ In 
Madame Bovary, 'discourses are copied out, simply set down…but no particular 
discursive position is taken, no one discourse assumed; the writing remains impersonal, 
uncommitted',
248
 the aim of this strategy being to recreate an image of the world in the 
objectivity of the work, which would be ‘complete in itself’, ‘independent of its producer. 
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‘Suspended in the infinite’…‘the artist must manage in such a way as to have posterity 
believe he did not live.’
249
 
 
Compare this aspiration with the aim of the early pioneers of photography, where absence of 
subject position was, as Geoffrey Batchen proposes, an almost universal aim shared by the 
inventors of around 1839. 'Almost all spoke of wanting to devise a means by which nature 
…could be made to represent itself automatically'.
250
 The image these inventors sought to 
capture, and fix, needed to be of the order of something that had been written without any 
subjective, cultural, intervention, as Talbot’s 'carefully considered wording of his invention - 
"The Process by Which Natural Objects May Be Made to Delineate Themselves without the 
Aid of the Artist’s Pencil" - indicated.’
251
 Thus linguist Ann Banfield, in her recent work, 
outlines the connection between the invention of the telescopic lens, leading to the 
development of the photographic image, and the emergence of a particular kind of ‘novelistic’ 
sentence. Banfield traces the advent of a way of thinking - a kind of consciousness coincident 
with the development of lens technology - that can be summed up as a ‘thinking oneself out 
of the picture’. As she argues, the conjunction of photography and writing (when writing – like 
hysteria - itself adopts a photographic mode) preserves the unspeakable, resists the 
reduction of experience into facts, history etc.
252
 'The advent of modern science', suggests 
Banfield, has 'opened up…spaces in which instruments – the telescope, the microscope – 
allow the viewing subject to see, to witness, places where he is not, indeed, where no subject 
is present. He thereby directly observes… the appearance of things in his absence, and that 
absence itself – his own – which scientific inference had already allowed him to conceive of 
and predict.'
253
 The realisation for the subject confronted with a photograph, as Banfield 
implies, is of a world of continuousness, a world that carries on, regardless of whether s/he is 
there or not. As Banfield stresses, 'the photograph records the contingency of the subject as 
such; this is the nature of death in it… [and it] does this by conjuring away the subject who 
observes, whether photographer or viewer.'
254
 This realisation, Banfield argues, 'is not co-
extensive with speech or communication'. Instead it can only be expressed 'in a specific 
linguistic style, uniquely written and literary, the style that constitutes narrative fiction' which 
permits, within its novelistic language, 'a subjectivity reduced to nothing else but what the 
instrument can record'.
255
 Banfield identifies a descriptive sentence, which she claims gives 
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'grammatical representation to the appearance of things not necessarily observed', and which 
she equates with the operation of the photograph. To do this she turns to Barthes, taking as 
her point of departure his photographic 'noeme', "This-has-been". However, in order to 
demonstrate that this unit of language does have an equivalence in writing, she argues that it 
should be 're-written'
256
, and proposes instead a "This was now here". In this way a particular 
type of sentence is produced that, as she argues, is structurally the same as the photograph. 
Following the argument above, this might imply that these sentences are hysterical; that in 
some way they stage desire.  
 
'Produced by a machine, by a scientific instrument, by a mechanical process, the recorded 
image is no longer anyone’s sensation' yet, Banfield suggests, 'in a precise and restricted 
way it remains subjective
257
. This is the way in which the photograph differs from any other 
image. As Barthes notes, the photograph is ‘not made by the hand of man’,
258
 nor is it the 
product of his mind. Photography, he writes ‘does not invent’,
259
 it simply records; so what is 
this neutral, impersonal, subjectivity'
260
 identified in the photograph? As Banfield points out, 
this unoccupied or subject-less subjectivity 'defines a complex of language as well. The term 
which contemporary linguistics assigns this complex is "deixis"',
261
 which, as Banfield notes, 
is a term also of interest to Barthes, who insists, in Camera Lucida, that 'the Photograph 'is 
never anything but an antiphon
262
 of "Look", "See", "Here it is"; it points a finger at a certain 
vis-à-vis and cannot escape this pure deictic language.'
263
 But it is Barthes’ choice of the term 
"This", with which he chooses to describe 'what the Photograph reproduces to infinity',
264
 that 
is of particular interest to Banfield, enabling her to equate the deictic "This" in linguistics with 
Barthes' 'referent' in photography. Furthermore, Banfield concurs that the referent of the 
photograph, the "This" 'is not an object but a sensation’.
265
 In linguistics, Banfield notes, the 
dualism of "This" 'is state-able without reference to an 'I'.' The deictic system, she argues, can 
be 'internally divided between those terms which represent the (personal) subject – I in 
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speech, he, she or a human they in the writing of the novel – and those which represent only 
a subjective centre – the deictic adverbials of time and place.'
266
 With "This", a thing is being 
indexed, but although there is (which it's deictic function implies) a place from which to see it, 
that place is not necessarily occupied by a subject, 'for a perspective may be unoccupied, its 
events grouped around an empty centre.'
267
 In the photograph, the "I" (or she, he or they) that 
might normally be witnessing the scene depicted, is replaced by the 'photographic plate',
268
 or 
camera. 'This', as Banfield adds, 'Lacan saw as well, and if the mirror is for him the model for 
the imaginary, its reflecting surface is in no way dependent on the existence of an observer
269
 
 
The constructed sentence that Banfield proposes, as a re-working of Barthes’ noeme, is one 
that also requires the addition of a "Now". Banfield argues that sentences with a now-in-the 
past, 'ie a past tense co-temporal with present time deictics'
270
, may represent an empty 
special and temporal centre, an impersonal subjectivity, where, in the place of a subject there 
is a subjective but unoccupied centre, an 'observation without an observer.'
271
 Here and Now 
name a private time and place 'which need not be occupied by a subject represented by a 
first or third person pronoun or other syntactically definable subjective elements.' This is a 
sentence that, Banfield argues, represents the unobserved.
272
 It does this by leaving the "I", 
ego or self, out. As Banfield states, 'For the Cogito, the sentence which names a subjectivity 
which is obligatorily first person and present tense, a "this is here and now being recorded" is 
substituted, or rather, to avoid any confusion with a sentence of speech containing a non-
explicit first person, "this was now being recorded"… or "The sun had now sunk lower in the 
sky"
273
, or simply, "this was now here". This  'complex of language', Banfield argues, is the 
equivalent of Barthes’ photographic ‘ca a ete’ (that-has-been).
274
 Re-written in the imperfect 
of the now-in-the-past it stands, she suggests, for Barthes’ "emanation of past reality".'
275
 It 
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also, Banfield suggests, 'coincides with an exclusively novelistic sentence'.
276
 The sentence 
with this, here or now, 'the localisation in language of a potentially impersonal subjectivity, but 
no subject, which represents in language the image externalised from a subject and recorded 
by the instrument, can only be realised in the writing of a novel. Out of this possibility', 
Banfield suggests, 'proceeds an entire productive category: novelistic description, whose 
special properties Flaubert was the first to exploit and the first …to thematise as the existence 
of the unobserved, of an infinite number of perspectives, not necessarily occupied by any 
human subject… this (is a style that) seeks to capture, to arrest within the moment, the 
appearances of things independent of the observer and his or her thoughts. And, insists 
Banfield, 'it is the novelists and novelist-theorists who have registered this… as if 
encountering in the very language of the novel a real and empirically determinable possibility, 
the disturbing presence of something impersonal, inhuman, past and in that sense, distant, 
"the this was now here".
277
 This is a type of narrative sentence or grammatical construction 
that can be used, as Virginia Woolf suggests, to describe ‘the world seen without a self”’
278
  
 
For Woolf, the problem of the unobserved 'becomes an explicit and central structuring 
principle of the novel’s thematic form'.
279
 In Woolf's novel The Waves, the question "How to 
describe the world seen without a self?" is repeatedly formulated, indeed, as Banfield 
suggests, it is 'presented as a problem for art.'
280
  The fact that one of the book's characters 
answers this question with "There are no words" is, she suggests, 'an indication of the 
centrality of this problem…and [of] its representation.'
281
 In the sentences from Woolf's book 
that follow, 'which make explicit the unobserved aspect of this vision' there is, Banfield insists, 
'no candidate for a fictional observer.' It is apparent, Banfield suggests, that 'Woolf means 
these sentences to …contrast with the first person monologues of the chapters themselves 
which…begin as presentations of perception:
282
  
 
The tree, that had burnt foxy red in spring and midsummer… was now black as iron and as bare.  
Here lay knife, fork and glass, but lengthened, swollen and made portentous.
283
  
Blue waves, green waves swept a quick fan over the beach, circling the spikes of sea-holly and leaving 
shallow pools of light here and there on the sand.
284
  
Now the sun had sunk. Sea and sky were indistinguishable.
285
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Similarly, in a section of To the Lighthouse called "Time Passes", Banfield notes, there is a 
description of the empty rooms of the house that consists 'of sentences in which a now in the 
past occurs but, where there is no observer to attribute their point of view, appear to [be]… 
recorded by instruments in the absence of any observer.
286
 This is a Look that doesn't see 
…for it is the lens that sees, not the photographer …all subjectivity that requires a subject, an 
"I" is eliminated…. [in addition, the photographer] has already been eliminated: the thing 
doesn’t need him there to be seen. The photograph is precisely Woolf’s “world seen without a 
self.”'
287
 Finally; ‘…this oxymoronic combination of present and past, life and absence of life, 
movement and stasis, can be translated, [ie can migrate from photography to ‘text’] not by the 
imparfait of the spoken language, but by a use of the imparfait restricted to written narrative 
and specifically, the novel.
288
 This is the tense that in French marks the style indirect libre 
…that style for the presentation of consciousness; [and] the tense unique to it is linguistically 
defined by the unspeakable simultaneity of now and the past, as in the following example 
from Madame Bovary where, in narrating herself [as a] now in the past, Emma (re)produces 
herself as image: "Quel Bonheur dans ce temps-la! quelle liberté! quel espoir! quelle 
abondance d’illusion! Il n’en restait plus, maintenant.". This, as Banfield also points out 'is this 
tense that Roland Barthes resorts to, in Camera Lucida, in order to recount the event that is 
central to his account of photography – the discovery of a photograph of a dead woman; "Et 
je la decouvris …La photographie était très ancienne",
289
 with a sentence that shifts, after the 
preterite of found – decouvris - to an imparfait – était; thus we enter, novelistically',
290
claims 
Banfield, 'a now-in-the past
291
.  
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Why might an artist or writer want to attempt to 'copy' this unit of language, to construct 
an'unspeakable sentence'
292
 or description of a world, without them in it?  The point might be 
to try and re-enter language on some other terms. In this way the novelistic narrative   could 
be considered, as Dennis Hollier comments in an essay on Surrealist 'autobiographical' texts 
such as Nadja, as 'a search for what, in literary space, would be the equivalent of what a 
shadow is in pictorial space
293
: an index that makes the work lose all virtuality, forever 
disturbs the calm of the image'.
'294
 The photograph makes it clear that it is the continued 
existence of things outside the self, without the mediation of a thought-full, speaking subject, 
which is disturbing to the individual. This is photography's 'disturbance'
295
. It is what the 
photograph, 'starting with the first photograph, Niepce’s picture of the table set with no one 
visible, literally and uncannily' shows. 'In the look of that table which needs no observer to 
look at it in order to continue to look like a table
296
 …the viewer meets with a start his own 
absence.'
297
 As Virginia Woolf observed in her essay “The Cinema”, “We behold [things] as 
they are when we are not there. We see life as it is when we have no part in it."
298
 And yet 
Woolf also suggested an alternative role for cinema. This, which must connect it to its 
indexicality, would be to represent 'thought in its wilderness, in its beauty, in its oddity' which 
could, in the moment of watching cinema, be experienced, made present, 'as smoke pours 
from Vesuvius'.
299
 
 
“I am Here” as Photographic noeme. 
In her two-part essay, Notes on the Index,
300
 Rosalind Krauss draws our attention to a group 
of artists who, either through a 'pervasive use'
301
, of the photographic medium, or through 
adapting a medium so that it becomes structurally or functionally similar to photography, 
make apparent within their works 'the presence of the index.'
302
 Krauss suggests that what is 
going on in the body of work that interests her is a 'conversion of the pictorial and sculptural 
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[i.e. symbolic] codes into that of the photographic message without a code'. This results in an 
alteration in, or disturbance to, the relationship between sign and meaning, where something 
irreducible and unsymbolisable operates in tension with (or as co-presence within) something 
closer to discourse; an artificial system based on the substitution and exchange of nameable 
things. Presented in the form of a list, Krauss begins her essay by noting the 'proliferating 
string of terms' that seem to emerge in any attempt to describe art from the 1970's (this 
decade is the context for her essay). She makes the observation that '70's art is 'diversified, 
split, factionalized.' There is no unified outlook or coherent theme, no dominant idea.  
However, the outlook is optimistic - perhaps even utopic - with Krauss suggesting that within 
this list of descriptive terms, 'there is prefigured an image of personal freedom.'
303
 In this 
'great plethora of possibilities', as she suggests, there is room for individual choice or will. 
This begs the question as to whether there isn't 'something else' going on, present in the work 
- other than 'style' - 'for which all these terms are a possible manifestation'.
304
 Indeed, as 
Krauss seems to be implying, these works might be engaging with something that is in itself 
like a list, that is note-like, provisional, able to be shuffled or sorted into any order,
305
 and that 
the string of descriptive terms generated by this work – the 'multiple options' – might be 
considered as structural echo of that which is being investigated within it. The work that 
interests Krauss is generally characterised by its autobiographic mode; ways in which the 
artist represents his or her subjectivity, or how s/he perceives him or her self within a 
social/cultural context. Yet the artists she focuses on appear to be aiming at a representation 
of selfhood that contains something that cannot be spoken, even though as I discuss below, 
this unspeakable thing might itself be manifested within or contained by speech. The role of 
the index in the works that interest Krauss is to reflect as trace, notation, print or cast, 
something of the self that is intermittent, variable, fragmentary; foregrounding the 'something 
else' which seems to exceed a single term; which is, like Barthes’ photograph, 'unclassifiable'. 
 
Krauss discusses Vito Acconci's 1973 video
306
 work Air Time,
307
 which presents us with a 
monologue in which there appears to be two separate 'voices', or positions from which to 
speak:  
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'…for 40 minutes the artist sits and talks to his reflected image. Referring to himself, he uses 
“I”, but not always. Sometimes he addresses his mirrored self as ‘you’. “You’ is a pronoun that 
is also filled, within the space of his recorded monologue, by an absent person, someone he 
imagines himself to be addressing. But the referent for this ‘you’ keeps slipping, shifting, 
returning once again to the “I” who is himself, reflected in the mirror.
 308
 
 
 ‘Acconci', suggests Krauss, 'is playing out the drama of the shifter.’ Caught in a loop, he 
plays with the confusion between a (desiring) self that speaks and an image of the self (on 
which the speaking self is hinged), which is mute but appears to 'lack' nothing. Acconci ties 
this confusion to the very words he uses to differentiate one self from the other: ‘I’ and ‘you’. 
These, as Krauss points out, are '”shifters”; ‘defined by Jakobson as linguistic signs that are 
“filled with signification” only because they are “empty”'. The word "This" (as Krauss reminds 
us) 'is such a sign, waiting each time it is evoked for its referent to be supplied. The personal 
pronouns "I" and "you" are also shifters'
309
 and, 'insofar as they are arbitrary' are obviously 
'part of the symbolic code of language'. However, they are also 'a case of linguistic sign which 
partakes of the symbol even while [sharing] the features of something else.' The pronouns, for 
example, depend for their meaning 'on the existential presence of a given speaker', and 
therefore, as is the case for all shifters,
310
 they 'announce themselves as [also] belonging to a 
different type of sign: the kind that is termed the index'.
311
 Therefore these signs are hybrids, 
both indexical and iconic, and thus, as I will explain in more detail below, they reflect the 
condition of subjectivity.  And this hybridity, as Krauss demonstrates, is also the case for the 
photograph. Krauss draws on C.S. Peirce's categorisation of signs to back up her claim that 
the photograph is inherently indexical, although this is complicated, as Pierce concedes, by 
the fact that photographs are representations and therefore also iconic.
312
 The complicated 
hybridity of the Photograph, where it either falls between the two categories of sign or is 
equally in both at once, with the result that it verges on being unclassifiable, evokes the 
condition of the subject, as split between "I" and "you", self and other – a fact that Acconci – 
amongst others - exploits in his work.   
 
Physical traces are obviously indexes (I mentioned Krauss's example of 'footprints' above). 
But I could add the spider's web to this list and, by extension, an individual's particular 
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drawing style or handwriting, especially their signature or autograph.
313
 These are types of 
graphic mark making that can be thought of as indexes that are attached to or derived from 
the self, like a cast shadow.
314
 Similarly, speech can be considered as an indexical trace of 
the shifter "I", when the person talking is temporarily occupying the place of the "I"; 'vacant' 
until the moment someone starts to speak. Quotes are also indexical 'marks’. These are all 
forms of 'marks or traces' of a particular cause; 'the actual referents of the shifters'.
315
 
Something could also be said about thumbprints, which, as is sometimes the case for 
signatures, are indexes of the body that are used to recognise or even legally verify the status 
of an individual, his or her existence; these are marks that are regarded as indexes of the 
truth, recognisable by law, that are used in legislation as certification of innocence or guilt.
316
  
However, I am interested in exploring the idea, which Krauss raises in this essay, that there 
are occasions when what the object the marks or traces signify is the fantasy, which has no 
corresponding point in reality; when the 'cause' of these marks (stemming from the 
imagination) is desire. Lacan uses the term 'shifter' (or index-term as he also calls it) 'to show 
the problematic and undecidable nature of the I'. As Dylan Evans elaborates, 'the I of the 
enunciation is not the same as the I of the statement… the shifter, which, in the statement 
designates him.'
317
  The "I" of the enunciation is the index of the self that speaks. However, 
self definition is composed, in part, through an identification with what Krauss describes as 'a 
felt connection to someone else', and self expression is grounded in the symbolic i.e. the "I" 
speaks through the other. 'It is within that condition of alienation', Krauss suggests, that 
fantasy 'takes root.'
318
 Fantasy is a component of the image one has of oneself, but it is also 
surplus to that identity; a part of the subject that escapes or evades symbolic definition. 
Nevertheless, as Krauss seems to be implying, fantasy, (as the referent of the shifter "I") can 
be indexed, pointed to. Suspended like smoke, or experienced as an echo, it makes an 
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impermanent mark on the here and now. Yet it can also be represented, embedded in an 
artwork.  
 
In order to - as Krauss describes it -  'play with the shifter', one needs a device - such as a 
mirror or a photograph - which can produce a doubling or multiplicity of “I" 's exchangeable 
with "you"'s. Indeed, Acconci has written that video and photography are appropriate 
'instruments of self-analysis and person to person relationships.' But, as Krauss points out, 
this slippage between the personal pronouns occurs in every day conversation: 'as we speak 
to one another, both of us using “I” and “you”, the referents of these words keep changing 
places across the space of our conversation’
319
 Acconci's Air Time establishes, according to 
Krauss, both the 'drama' of the shifter, and its 'indexicality', providing 'a space in which 
linguistic confusion operates in concert with the narcissism implicit in the performers relation 
to the mirror [with his 'self' and 'other' from which his speech 'derives']. But this conjunction 
[and the possible confusion that may result - on which hysteria draws] is perfectly logical. As 
Krauss re-iterates, with reference to Lacan, identification is constructed through the double
320
, 
through the reflected image in the mirror mediated by the (m)other. '[T]he self is felt… only as 
an image of the self.'
321
 So, in the sense that Rosalind Krauss establishes for it  - ie as a trace 
of the 'self - the index is tied to a kind of emptiness, as either a type of mirror image (or 
reflection) of something that isn't there, or as an unoccupied position that 'waits' to be filled.  
 
The self, as the video work by Vito Acconci described above demonstrates, is dividable into 
an 'I" and a "you"; it can contain, and speak from, both these linguistic 'positions'. However, 
as Krauss suggests, in Acconci's work this 'drama' is acted out 'in its regressive form.'
322
 
Regressive, both because the work re-enacts a state before the differentiation, or split, 
between the positions "I" and "you" have been successfully formulated, and because it is 
narcissistic; no one else is involved, no other intrudes to spoil the scene (the other as "you" is 
the same as the "I"). In this way, Acconci's work points to the illusory, artificial and above all 
fragile state of this subjective split; it can easily breakdown. As Krauss points out, until the 
child passes through Lacan's "mirror stage", leaving the narcissistic bliss contained in a body 
undifferentiated from the world around it in exchange for a 'self' that, defined by the other, 
resides in an alienating image, he or she does not recognise the difference between the 
terms "I" and "you". In fact, children usually echo back - when they mean to say "I" - the term 
they have recognised as addressed to them: "you". Aphasics, Krauss notes, lose the ability to 
recognise this difference.  Therefore, in also muddling up the usage of these terms, 
Acconnci's Air Time performs a step backwards in the subjective mode. The constitution of 
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the subject hinges on the moment that s/he is able to differentiate between him or her self 
and another person. Selfhood, as Krauss elaborates, as the difference between "I" and "you", 
pivots on the correct use of these signs. The child, Dick, in Lacan's case history cited 
above
323
, was an example of a human individual who was not, in the terms just described, yet 
a subject, who had not moved, as Krauss defines the process, from 'a global, undifferentiated 
sense of himself towards a distinct, integrated notion of selfhood – one that could be 
symbolised through an individuated use of "I" and "you".'
324
  
 
Yet Krauss is interested in the way in which artists (she cites Duchamp's work in particular) in 
refusing to properly recognise or stay within the boundary of a self differentiated from an 
'other', have produced what she calls 'split self portraits': works that both point to the division 
of the self and retain something continuous, simultaneous and undifferentiated; works that 
seem to indicate that the subject can appear to 'hesitate'
325
 on this boundary between "I" and 
"you", self and other. Krauss notes that this 'splitting' can occur, as is the case within some of 
Duchamp's work, along the lines of sexual identity (she/ he) but also, importantly, as this links 
the condition of selfhood with the operation of the photograph, along the semiotic axis of icon 
and index. For example, Duchamp's work With My Tongue in My Cheek (1959), which refers 
through its title to the ironic position Duchamp takes in relation to his practice, also, as Krauss 
notes, 'both contemplates and instances… a rupture between image and speech, or more 
specifically, language.'
326
 In this way, this hesitation or refusal to take one position or another, 
ie to either adopt a position in language as a speaking subject or to stay as self-contained, 
mute, narcissist entertains the fantasy, defined more fully below, of a time before any choice 
had to be made at all. 
 
'On a sheet of paper Duchamp sketches his profile, depicting himself in the representational 
terms of the graphic icon. On top pf this drawing, coincident with part of its contour, is added 
the area of chin and check, cast from his own face in plaster. Index is juxtaposed to icon…'
327
  
 
Taken literally, i.e. word for word (as, for example, a psychotic would) this phrase –  as title  - 
could mean one only thing. As Krauss points out; 'to actually place one's tongue in one's 
cheek is to lose the capacity for speech altogether.'
328
 In this way, Duchamp's work presents 
'a kind of trauma of signification.'
329
 Two competing sign systems are present at the same 
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time; the icon – in the form of the drawing, which, as a representation, is part of the realm of 
language - and the index, the cast of the cheek, which as pure 'uncoded' image, Krauss 
opposes to the symbolic system of language. The later work of Marcel Duchamp, argues 
Krauss, demonstrates ways in which ‘the use of the shifter to locate the self in relation to its 
world' can collapse. His work, she argues, exemplifies ways in which artists can engage with 
this phenomena
330
 and use it as a model for a practice aimed 'the problem of naming [or 
locating, perhaps] an individuated self'.
331
 His piece Tu m’, [simply, ‘you/me’] is one way of 
signalling the potential for disaster that the shifter presents.  Another is the division of the self 
into an ‘I’ and a ‘you’ through the adoption of an alter-ego… “Rose Selavy and I”.
332
 Other 
examples of Duchamp's work that Krauss identifies as being both (split) self-portraiture (the 
self projected as double), and as bearing (testifying to) the indexical character of the 
photograph, include the Large Glass. What she claims for these works is the co-presence of 
the index (the photograph as always indexical) which sits alongside and disturbs their iconic 
status. A photograph contains an element – as physical imprint - that 'short-circuits' or 
bypasses the symbolic. The meaning or interpretation of this indexical element remains 'in 
those modes of identification that are associated with the Imaginary'
333
 - ie the fantasy. This, 
one could argue, is exactly like the hysterical symptom. For Duchamp, the project of depicting 
the self took on these qualities 'of enigmatic refusal and mask.'
334
 The resulting artworks are 
branded, stamped or imprinted with the insistence of something unrepresentable, connected 
to the body.  
 
There is also, as Krauss points out, another way that this desiring body can be heard -quite 
literally - through speech as addressed to the other, a process that indexes the "I" of the 
spoken word. Krauss gives as example another artwork that has interested her, another 
monologue; that of Deborah Hay, a dancer who, instead of dancing, speaks to her audience 
in a live performance and tells them that ‘instead of dancing she wished to talk.' In this way 
                                                                                                                                       
inventor of the Rayograph' or photogram, 'which forces the issue of photography's existence as an 
index.' (Krauss, op. cit. p203) 
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 Ibid., p199 The way that Duchamp does this is more fully explained in Annette Michelson's (1973) 
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psychopathological syndrome of autism and specific aspects of Duchamp’s art.’  
331 
Ibid.,  p200 
332 
Duchamp can say, and does so in writing, "Rrose Selavy and I", which indicates that someone, or 
something, else speaks at the same time as he does. Language, in this sentence, becomes occupied by 
a double which is both self and other – this as a strategy for staging the return of something that 
language may have taken out, extracted (as the price for entry into the Symbolic, the cut or mark of 
subjectivity). However, it is not just or not only through the addition of an 'other' into his speech (an other 
who also happens to be of the opposite sex) that Duchamp 'infects' (Kp200) disrupts or disturbs 
language, upsetting, as Krauss suggests, 'the balance of meaning.' It is also through the homophonic 
confusion caused by the name – or sound – of Rrose Selavy which, through the way that it is heard, 
turns into a sentence.  Rrose Selavy transforms (in spoken French) into Eros, C'est la vie, which in turn 
evokes the death drive, Thanatos, opposed by Freud to Eros, the drive to conserve life, to stay alive. 
'The confusion in the shifter couples', as Krauss asserts, 'with another kind of breakdown, as form 
begins to erode the certainty of content' (cf Joyce) and 'sheer musicality' is substituted 'for the process 
of signification.'332 The signifier falls, drops away from, its referent - and vice versa, as the referent 
disappears. 
333
Krauss, R. (1986) The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, MIT Press, p203 
334 
Ibid.,p202 
 70 
the audience witnessed  'a verbal discourse through which the subject repeats the simple fact 
that she is present’ The substance of her monologue – ie its 'essence' - is that she was there 
(note that the speaking of this would have been in the present tense, as in an "I am here"). In 
presenting herself to the audience through speech, Hay's performance could be interpreted 
as both a refusal of and a contribution to her particular discipline; dance. As Krauss suggests, 
her action was 'a flight from the terms of aesthetic convention' coupled with the ideal of 
achieving 'total self presence'; with this latter component being aligned to the fantasy (that 
nothing was ever given up). Hay had begun her performance by telling her audience that she 
had come to dance with the aspiration that, through it, she would be able to 'be in touch with 
the movement of every cell in her body'. By repeating the simple fact that she is present Hay 
thereby duplicates the fantasy, both structurally and in terms of its content, as the content of 
her fantasy is simply the desire to speak, 'to have recourse to speech'
335
 rather than to speak 
of any particular one thing or another.   
 
There is, Krauss asserts, a 'logical relation' between the three components of Hay's 
performance; the refusal or absence of the usual codes of dance, the presence of speech as 
indexical trace of the body in the here and now (for which the 'language' of dance is 
exchanged) and finally the staging of the fantasy (something inside the self, connected to 'self 
definition'), all of which add up, as  Krauss argues to 'the reduction of the conventional sign to 
a trace' The element of refusal, the retention or staging of the fantasy combined with a kind of 
reduced speech, also has a structural similarity to hysteria. What is indexed in this 
performance is a kind of pure subjectivity – the essence of the desiring subject – as desire to 
register the trace of being. ‘The movement  [ie speech] to which Hay turns – a kind of 
Brownian motion
336
 of the self – has about it this quality of trace.’ Hay's performance does 
however aim at representation because it still uses language  – her speech is both 
unsymbolisable index and 'supplemental discourse'. 
 
The Lacanian analyst Bruce Fink has written about ways in which the subject lies somewhere 
'"between language and jouissance": the subject can have either some sort of primordial 
[regressive] pleasure or language, but not both. But to become a subject, the infant, so to 
speak, has no choice, or at best a sort of "forced choice". She or he 'has to be "seduced", 
enticed,' – one could almost say "hoodwinked" - into making this choice; that is, plunging in 
favour of language.  Fantasy, as Fink continues, 'is the attempt to bring the two elements of 
the choice – the subject of language and jouissance – together in such a way that they are 
"compossible".
337
 Fantasy thus attempts to overcome the either/or, the choice made that 
responsible for the advent of the subject and for a loss of satisfaction; it stages the attempt to 
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reverse that loss.'
338
 In other words, the breakdown in the use of the shifter mentioned above, 
the lack of a clear difference between the labels "I" and "you" and the refusal to differentiate 
between self and other – with this action being characterised by a sense of 'return' - is part of 
the aim of the fantasy. Fantasy (motivated by desire, loss) tries to speak outside of, or find an 
alternative route within, the language imposed on the subject by the symbolic system, and 
through which (through differentiation, discontinuity and a process of never ending 
substitution) a convention of meaning is established. Note, as Michael Finn suggests, 'one of 
the central Proustian strategies for dealing with the world of the already verbally recognised 
and qualified, is to circumvent language entirely, to pass through to language's other side, 
where words have not yet been uttered.'
339
 Like desire, the photograph contains an element 
that evades symbolisation; as mentioned above, that which is indexical (ie all of it) is outside 
the symbolic system. But the photograph is also a representation, an image. In this way the 
photograph introduces a confusion at the level of the signifier, echoed within the desiring 
subject. In terms of desire the "I was here" of the indexical mark allows the fantasy to remain 
untouched by language, to trace something that is unsymbolisable – that is outside the 
symbolic order What are these marks? More than just meaningless scribbles, perhaps they 
are closer to what Barthes calls doodles which have something of the daydream (as fantasy) 
attached to them – simply 'the signifier without the signified.' It is significant that after 
reproducing these illegible marks, Barthes returns - for the final page of his book - to writing 
and in his own hand states, 'One writes with one's desire, and I am not through desiring.'  
 
How does this link to ideas about the fantasy/ the conditions of photography? Krauss argues 
that the bodies' movement can be understood 'as something the body does not produce.' 
Instead, it can be thought of as a 'circumstance' i.e. an event in time 'that is registered on it 
(or, invisibly, within it).' This circumstance, in other words, is what is traced (or what traces 
itself) in Hay's spoken performance. As it does so, Krauss argues, it 'ceases to function 
symbolically and takes on the character of the index.' It becomes a manifestation of presence, 
directly traceable to its cause: the "I" that 'speaks'. Yet this presence, this 'trace of the body's 
life' as a message that translates into the statement "I am here", is an experience of pure 
consciousness that, as argued in the first part of this thesis, cannot operate at the same time 
as the 'self', through which, within which, experience is registered only in the aftermath. Is the 
self, therefore, absent at this moment of speaking? Krauss seems to indicate that it might be. 
'[T]his cellular motion
340
 of which Hay speaks [within the very act of speaking] is specifically 
uncoded.
341
 It is, as Krauss argues, 'disengaged from the codes of dance' but it is also 
incompatible with the self. In the instance of the spoken word we are in the irreducible 
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presence of the "I"; traced within – or as - the search for words.
342
 So, although there is a 
message in Hay's speech, it is, as Krauss claims, 'a message without a code' – ie a message 
from which the symbolic, the other, is absent. There is, however, a message in the words Hay 
uses, as they become joined up into sentences, as they form particular grammatical 
constructions. This work of art is a representation; the "I" is literally 'staged'; it can only be 
presented as co-presence to a 'self' that uses language.  The self acknowledges the codes, 
addresses itself to an Other, through the very act of choosing one word over another and 
linking them up to make communicable 'sense'. In this way the uncoded message "I" is, as 
Krauss argues, 'supplemented' by the presence of a discourse; one that repeats - as echo - 
'the message of pure presence in an articulated language.'
343
 The message therefore 
translates, it is converted into language and becomes readable. The unit of language "I am 
here" as index of pure presence, pure consciousness, becomes a message, a representation, 
as soon as it has been stated, as soon as it has been spoken.  
 
Without this supplement, this mediation through a language that involves the other, the 
message would simply be: "There is a message" (which would be how it would be received 
by someone who falls into the psychoanalytic category of psychosis.
344
) Furthermore, as I 
have been indicating, because of the fact that meaning, as a product of discourse, comes 
after the message has been delivered, "I am here" is only understood retroactively. Presence 
has no meaning - there is no meaning in it. Hay needs to get to the end of her sentence to 
'send' her message. Her message is received, understood, only after she has finished 
speaking it. Meaning occurs in language only when what is being communicated has already 
been announced, written or read, it does not occur in the saying, writing or reading; nothing 
means anything until you reach the end of the sentence - or the punctuation mark.  In this 
uncoded (indexical) message, 'meaning' returns, as (symbolic) afterthought. The "I" – based 
in the imaginary - registers its presence retroactively, mediated through the particular set of 
identifications that make up the speaker, the self. Therefore "I am Here" is always, like the 
photographic noeme, "That-has-been"; an image that 'returns'. As Barthes elaborates; by 
stating that the photographic evidence is "that has been", 'what I posit is not only the absence 
of the object; it is also, by one and the same movement, on equal terms, the fact that this 
                                                
342 
Lacan defined neurotics – ie anyone who is a subject of (or to) desire - as people who 'speak beyond 
the words they consciously use', while psychotics on the other hand 'talk freely and fluently without 
really speaking.' Neurotics cannot prevent themselves from saying more than they intend to convey, 
whereas psychotics do not manage to speak, however articulate the sentences they produce. For the 
neurotic, speech functions beyond verbalised language, in the psychotic language operates without 
speech. 
343 
Krauss, R. (1986) The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, ‘Notes on the 
Index’, MIT Press, All quotes in this paragraph are from p211 
344 
In other words, there would be no content to the message. In fact there is very little content to Hay's 
message but what there is, ie "I am here" is the very thing that a psychotic could not articulate (Being 
'here', for example, means you can't be 'there'. In the very act of designating a place, the speaker has to 
make a choice has to differentiate between one thing or another, and thereby acknowledge the gap in 
language… "I am here" automatically supposes a "You" to whom this statement is addressed; a “you” 
who must be "there", where "I" am not. 
 73 
object has indeed existed.'
345
 Regarded in these terms, speech is the epitome of the 
'perishable trace' – registering in memory only after it has faded into silence, after which point 
it (as "I") is no longer there.  
 
Krauss uses the phrase "message without a code" to link her thoughts to those of Roland 
Barthes
346
 and thereby to connect the logic of Hay's work to what she takes to be the 
'inherent features' of the photograph. Barthes made this statement about the photographic 
image - that it was 'fundamentally uncoded'
347
 - some fifteen years before he came to write 
Camera Lucida, and although he then slightly modifies it, the idea is still relevant to this 
discussion because it gives representation to that which within the photograph is 
unsymbolisable, disturbing, unclassifiable; that which is outside the subject, who is 
unnecessary to it. 'The realists', as Barthes declares in Camera Lucida, 'of whom I am one 
and of whom I was already one when I asserted that the Photograph was an image without a 
code …do not take the photograph for a copy of reality, but for an emanation of past reality… 
The important thing is that the photograph possesses an evidential force, and that its 
testimony bears not on the object but on time. [In this way, the photograph's] 'power of 
authentication exceeds the power of representation'.
348
 Through its indexicality (although 
Barthes doesn't use this word, preferring "Reference"
349
) the photograph represents that 
which is outside, in excess or beyond representation and thus echoes the kind of pre-
symbolic (or unsymbolisable) component of identity – a pre-subject before the split caused by 
the entry into language - which the fantasy strives to reproduce. Indeed as Krauss notes, it is 
'the order of the natural world that imprints itself on the photographic emulsion… [like a] 
transfer or trace'
350
; a world that, as described by Virginia Woolf, is 'without a self'; the 
experience of which is beyond or before language. 'The connective tissue binding the objects 
contained by the photograph', as Krauss asserts, 'is that of the world itself, rather than that of 
a cultural system.'
351
 Yet (as discussed above) certain artists have chosen to work with 'the 
terminology of the index'; to incorporate the immediate, physical, presence of an indexical 
mark into their works precisely in order to stage a presence of their own. Can it be that these 
indexical traces or cast objects (which include that which echoes in speech) are offered as 
substitute for the un-split (or regressed) subject? It seems that there may be a point at which 
the un-coded index coincides with the fantasy of self presence that is the "I". (Although in fact 
the very act of substitution (re)introduces discontinuity, symbolic exchange – ie in accordance 
with structure of the fantasy the artists want to have their cake and eat it, the fantasy is to 
pivot between the I and the you).  
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As Krauss suggests, this place of either coincidence or substitution (or both) may be located 
somewhere on or near the frame. In the work that she is focussing on, the function and, 
frequently, the conventional form of the frame - as  'edge' of an image – changes. Instead of 
the frame being the thing that establishes or designates a limit (in response to the internal 
meaning of a work) the work itself becomes the frame; it is given 'the role of selection 
(gathering a visually intelligible sample of the underlying continuum) in order to become 
'repository' of this natural continuum, as 'evidence' of it. The artists of interest to Krauss  
'transfer [by or as] impression or cast', the features of the natural world onto or into an image, 
'the way the word "this", accompanied by a pointing gesture isolates a piece of the real world 
and fills itself with meaning by becoming, for that moment, the transitory label [sign or 
announcement] of a natural event.'
352
 "This" as pointing gesture  - the act itself - of isolating a 
piece of the world – coincides with the frame. The work, Krauss argues, functions as indexical 
shifter – filled or emptied in relation to the presence or absence of something that causes the 
'quasi-tautological relationship between signifier and signified with which Barthes 
characterises [the flat surface of] the photograph'
353
 to be interrupted - punctuated - by 
something intermittent, discontinuous. 'By the mark of something', as Barthes writes, 'the 
photograph is no longer "anything whatever"' The referent does not, cannot in itself signify, 
but something to do the return of the natural world presented as evidence of a past that has 
disappeared provokes 'a tiny shock… a fulguration',
354
 which is also an addition. The 
photograph is no longer the 'continuous message' for Barthes,
355
 yet 'what I add to the 
photograph [is] nonetheless already there.'
356
 Something, in other words, that strays beyond 
the frame.
357
 It is here, as Barthes suggests, that 'a blind field is created.'
358
 The artists point 
to or 'frame' the natural continuum - where a mark can function as a frame, a breaking point, 
and vice versa - and by doing so intercut or break the undifferentiated continuity with 
something connected to the way in which the shifter "I" is temporally filled in speech. 
Something interrupts, ruptures or punctuates… What I am trying to do is link the blind field 
established by the frame or pointing gesture of the artwork to Barthes’ experience of the 
Punctum as punctuation mark, cut, gap or subtle beyond which launches desire… ‘beyond 
what it permits us to see.’ 
359
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Some Words About My Work 
After a period of time spent in what the writer W. G. Sebald has described as 'a state of 
almost total immobility',
 360 
 I made a decision - in order to do something, such was the 
paralysis brought on by the way that this research, often producing little more per day than a 
couple of scribbled, half formed, sentences, was eating into my practice and thereby causing 
me a great deal of anxiety – that I would fill in each box of a commercially bought year 
planner that corresponded to the days on which I could say I was 'present'. (This might mean, 
echoing On Karawa, that I thought I was (still) 'alive', or simply that I was 'in the studio'.) I 
started this on the 1
st
 of January 2004 and continued the process until December 31
st
, 2006. 
The images resulting from this process, or decision, are made up out of the repeated action of 
filling - although this could also be more accurately described as an emptying. The process of 
making my presence, as blocking out or erasure of another day represented on the year 
planner, coincides with a moment of blindness. The moment that my pen (constrained by the 
stencil that I use for the job and by the commercially designed year planner itself) makes 
contact with the surface of the planner and performs the proscribed task is a curious one… 
the ink flows, makes a set of marks which form into a solid ‘shape’ and at the same time 
some sort of oblivion occurs. Making a mark in this way therefore coincides with a moment of 
not thinking – the process in fact disallows thought (I must not be diverted from the task in 
hand or it won’t ‘work’). More precisely, this is a moment in which thought is disabled, with the 
action both registering my presence and erasing another day. At the end of each year each 
‘completed’ planner, with its squares either filled in or left empty, functions as a record of 
hidden or forgotten events that are either mundane or, to me, important and meaningful; but 
with everything reduced to the same kind of mark, to nothing but a kind of nullifying cloud. 
Either marking time or killing time, I would align this process to Krauss's description of a kind 
of drawing that can be 'converted from its formal status of encoding reality [in my case the 
presence or absence of the "I"] to that of imprinting it.'
361
 Because these works have the 
status of the index they thereby also reference/relate to the action of photography and stage 
something to do with the self that is unrepresentable - a fleeting, intermittent "I" – present in 
the gaps in works that look like writing, or are between writing and a kind of scribble. I would 
align this practice with what Jorg Heiser has characterised a as romantic or 'emotional' 
conceptualism; a 'highly abstracted, formalised concern with the attributes of romanticism 
historically ascribed to artists, adolescents, women and the insane; feelings of alienation, 
solitude, unfulfilled longing, self-mutilation and melancholia'. Heiser identifies the work of Bas 
Jan Ader, which 'invests the Conceptual with what appears to be its antithesis', as being 'all 
about systematically treating the un-systematic: trying the "mend" the split [between some 
such concise intellectual system and "the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings"] by 
admitting its existence… [this as the] contradictory reality [of the mind].'
362
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Conclusion 
As an outcome of this research I have made a new body of diagrammatic works that 
represent – or track - certain personal, characteristic, ‘traits’. These works are made by 
collating information from notes in diaries, from chequebook stubs or medical records etc., 
and mapping them onto year planners. These ‘drawings’ are then further simplified by 
translation into a graphic design program to produce a pattern as notation of my activity, 
minus the specific days, dates, months or year. The information gathered, reduced to a 
simple transcription, drawing or chart, records incidences of repetitive, cyclical, often 
mundane or absurd behaviour such as spending patterns, periods of hypochondria, or visits 
to the hairdresser. I see these works as self or auto-portraits, or body casts; their patterns 
dictated more by unconscious behaviour than an organising, centred, self. The resulting 
images also take a form that is similar to writing. The attempt is to stage an utterance
363
, to 
make a kind of picture: of habit, action, or speech. And the aim of this pictorial writing, is not 
so much to describe as communicate, so that the image appears like a coded sign or 
message  - but one in which gaps, lapses and silences play a component part.  
 
As Benjamin reminds us, the Latin word textum (text) means web. In the written component of 
this thesis I have attempted to weave together a text that both locates, within theory, 
something, bound up with remembering but tied to forgetting, which I refer to as the ‘blank’; 
identified by the momentary lapses, gaps, or silences in everyday speech, and to raise 
questions about how I as an artist might find a way of working with this kind of ‘mark’. 
Remembrance (not memory) is closer to forgetting; hence its relation or link to the trauma, 
and to its obsessive nature, the repetitive or compulsive, somewhat lawless, activity that often 
accompanies it. My work might take the form of a compulsive restaging of an event – which I 
have described as the spider web ‘incident’ - that I encountered as a child; and where the 
holes in the net or text of my drawings and diagrammatic prints, derived from the movement 
of my body, like dropped stitches, stand in for (represent) moments of blanking out; for 
something that fails to register, to get into language. The images themselves, which are 
based on the notion of a (missed) encounter, are also visually similar to the spider webs, 
which showed me something terrible, showed me what happens without thought, without a 
self. When I saw them I had the sense of something continuing automatically, ungoverned, 
regardless, ie blindly – with neither “I” nor eye. That one can be possessed or directed by 
something outside one’s control frightened me. Yet I have come to realise that what I 
encountered also represented a kind of fascinating possibility of invention - the breaking off 
from habit - in order  to develop a new way of writing or drawing; a new form of expression. 
The spider webs were saying something at (or about) the limits of speech, mapping out the 
gaps in language, which is also at the limits of memory, of subjectivity – beyond which lies the 
unknown. I am interested in the idea that something that can exist or operate between 
memory and forgetting (this, like the action of the spider). The drugged spider spider’s 
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movement could be described as a combination between what it knew (its genetic 
evolutionary programming – on which its life depends) and what it had forgotten; it drew on 
what its forgetting had left behind, from the ruins, the remains of that ‘memory’. Building from 
the point at which it can no longer remember, yet, through remembering something  (it 
continues to move - compulsively) it makes something else. This new kind of thing that is 
created echoes the photographic operation - as blanking - of remembrance. 
 
Artists have a hunger for, perhaps even a dependence on, ideas outside their own field. What 
I have done here is to try and give an account of some of the themes discovered (particularly 
within Barthes’ book Camera Lucida) that I consider relevant or important to me as an artist. 
My main response, however, is articulated with my visual practice. Through the new works 
documented in this thesis I have proposed a way of 'writing the self' that, reflecting the 
photographic process, is indexical in that the images (like 'texts') created have a direct, 
physical, relation to their cause -  the record of the artist's tears is 'the artists tears', for 
instance. Yet this indexicality is undermined by their reference to a pictorial tradition. In this 
way I am evading either category in the search for something between, the model for which 
might be Barthes’ ‘third form’. If the ‘blank’ is that towards which my practice is aimed, 
perhaps it can be defined as the attempt to convert speech into mark. 
 
Finally, I should say something about the fact that my recent work does not use photography 
– despite being generated out of an interest in photography theory. The aim of my work is to 
stage that which remains unsymbolisable or blank. In order to achieve this I have embeded 
within the images something that has a indexical relation – through direct physical contact 
with its referent - to that which caused it. Through the operation of the index, which, as Krauss 
argues, bypasses any symbolic, cultural, system of language, physical presence is registered 
as !meaninglessness". Since digitalisation it is no longer possible to stage this absence or 
unsymbolised presence through !straight" photography – therefore some other strategy has to 
be found. And it seems to me that the recent turn (or return) amongst contemporary artists to 
a certain kind of drawing or mark making – one which shares the properties of the photograph 
– is directly related to a loss of belief in photography"s indexicality. 
 
 
In the next section I include images of a recent exhibition, plus examples of related works.  
 
Information about the exhibition can be found in the appendix.  
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